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“The report of my illness grew out of his illness.  The 
report of my death was an exaggeration.”1 
—Mark Twain 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In its 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation for Medical Education 
and Research v. United States, the Supreme Court announced that 
it was “not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative 
review good for tax law only.”2  Following Mayo, it has come into 
vogue among scholars of tax law to declare the death of tax 
exceptionalism.3  Like the reports of Mark Twain’s death, these 
pronouncements are exaggerations.4  The Mayo Court itself 
                                                                                                                   
 1 See TWAINQUOTES.COM, http://www.twainquotes.com/Death.html (last visited Feb. 15, 
2015) (displaying an image of a note written by Mark Twain).  Somewhat ironically, this 
quotation has often been misreported as “Reports [or rumors] of my death have been greatly 
exaggerated.”  See, e.g., Charles A. Sullivan, On Vacation, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 1143, 1153 n.55 
(2006) (documenting the common confusion); Wendy Parker, The Future of School 
Desegregation, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 1157, 1161 n.29 (2000) (noting and correcting the quoted 
error). 
 2 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011). 
 3 See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 465, 466 
(2013) (“[T]he Supreme Court rejected tax exceptionalism . . . .”); Steve R. Johnson, Preserving 
Fairness in Tax Administration in the Mayo Era, 32 VA. TAX REV. 269, 279 (2012) (noting that 
“the Mayo Court disposed of tax exceptionalism,” while cautioning that “[p]recisely how far we 
can go in this direction remains to be seen” due to the “revenue imperative”); Leandra 
Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.U. 
L. REV. 643, 696–98 (2012) (proposing to consider facts surrounding issuance of rule under 
applicable deference standard and noting that the Mayo Court was “loath” to create an 
exception for tax cases); Shannon Weeks McCormack, Tax Abuse According to Whom?, 15 FLA. 
TAX REV. 1, 5–7 (2013) (examining how much deference should be given to IRS’s and 
Treasury’s decision to issue retroactive rules to combat abuse); James M. Puckett, Embracing 
the Queen of Hearts: Deference to Retroactive Tax Rules, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 349, 366–74 
(2013) (arguing that the Code’s rulemaking provisions significantly modify APA procedures); 
Andre L. Smith, The Nondelegation Doctrine and the Federal Income Tax: May Congress 
Grant the President the Authority to Set the Income Tax Rates?, 31 VA. TAX REV. 763, 778 
(2012) (“The current trend, however, is towards rejecting so-called tax exceptionalism.”); Roger 
Dorsey, Mayo and the End of ‘Tax Exceptionalism’ in Judicial Deference, 87 PRAC. TAX 
STRATEGIES 63, 68 (2011) (“The era of tax exceptionalism in judicial deference is over.”). 
 4 Others have recently pushed back, explicitly or implicitly, against the idea that tax 
exceptionalism is dead.  However, they have focused on rulemaking or adjudication rather 
than the broader structure of tax administration.  Bryan Camp has argued that the pre-
APA history of tax rulemaking should inform our application of the legislative versus 
interpretative rule divide.  See Bryan T. Camp, A History of Tax Regulation Prior to the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 1714–15 (2014) (“Those who write in this 
area must not fall into the presentist fallacy of assuming that the terms of the APA contain 
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explicitly hedged its generalization about a uniform approach to 
judicial review, leaving a foothold for those who argue that 
“justification” exists for applying different approaches to judicial 
review of tax administration.5  In many circumstances, such a 
justification exists in the structure of tax administration under the 
Internal Revenue Code (Code or I.R.C.),6 which differs from the 
template set forth in the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).7  
Accordingly, tax exceptionalism seems likely to remain alive and 
well, even if it may nominally constitute a residual phenomenon 
rather than a guiding principle.  
The acceptations of “tax exceptionalism” are diverse; this 
Article addresses “the notion that tax law is somehow deeply 
different from other law, with the result that many of the rules 
that apply trans-substantively across the rest of the legal 
landscape do not, or should not, apply to tax.”8  The idea of tax 
exceptionalism, and criticisms of it, are not new.9  Courts seemed 
                                                                                                                   
meaning independent of history and of the administrative context to which they are 
applied.”).  Richard Murphy has suggested that the flexibility of general administrative law 
concepts, such as interpretative versus legislative, could leave courts room to find tax 
regulations interpretative. See Richard Murphy, Pragmatic Administrative Law and Tax 
Exceptionalism, 64 DUKE L.J. ONLINE 21, 24 (2014).  Steve Johnson has proposed a nuanced 
approach to the reasoned explanation requirement, based in part on prudential 
considerations, with respect to IRS adjudication. See Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned 
Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 DUKE L.J. 1771, 1773–77 (2014).  
 5 See Mayo, 562 U.S. at 55 (“Mayo has not advanced any justification for applying a less 
deferential standard of review . . . . In the absence of such justification, we are not inclined 
to carve out an approach . . . good for tax law only.”). 
 6 Title 26 of the United States Code. 
 7 Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 
U.S.C.). 
 8 Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897, 1901 
(2014).  The compelling government interest in revenue collection is often proffered as a 
justification for treating tax as special.  See Kristin E. Hickman, Administering the Tax 
System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1720 (2014).  Professor Hickman has estimated that “a 
lot—maybe even a majority—of the effort that Treasury and the IRS spend promulgating 
regulations concerns . . . functions other than raising revenue.”  Id. at 1723.  Accordingly, 
Hickman has proposed reconsideration of certain statutory exceptions from APA 
requirements. Id.  These arguably “nontax programs” may well merit special analysis, 
which lies beyond the scope of this Article. Cf. id. at 1761 (calling for Congress and the 
courts to “contemplate more seriously the potential administrative-law implications of 
situating nontax programs” in the Code). 
 9 One of the best known works criticizing tax exceptionalism recommended more 
borrowing between tax and non-tax areas of law, a relationship which could be mutually 
beneficial.  See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow Up to Be 
Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 531–32 (1994) (criticizing the isolation of tax from non-
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to embrace tax exceptionalism by citing tax-specific precedents 
with different standards when reviewing interpretations of law 
adopted by the IRS and Treasury, rather than merging tax 
jurisprudence with authorities that apply to non-tax judicial 
review.10  It has only been since 2011 with Mayo that the tax bar 
has seen a rejection, in at least a general way, of tax 
exceptionalism by the Supreme Court.  Unsurprisingly, the precise 
ramifications of Mayo on the tax administration have not yet been 
sorted out.  
A plausible overall account of tax administration must address 
rulemaking procedures.  Although solicitation of pre-promulgation 
public comments on proposed regulations—as occurred with the 
regulations at issue in Mayo—is standard operating procedure,11 
the greater context of tax guidance is not so simple.  The IRS and 
Treasury sometimes have not undertaken APA-style notice and 
comment rulemaking.12  In certain scenarios, the IRS and 
Treasury have published final regulations or other published 
guidance without first (or, perhaps, ever) soliciting public 
                                                                                                                   
tax jurisprudence and the resulting justification of different methods of statutory 
interpretation for tax versus non-tax areas of law).  Professor Hickman later critiqued tax 
exceptionalism in the context of judicial deference to Treasury regulations and Treasury’s 
failure to undertake notice-and-comment procedures when required.  See generally Kristin 
E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 
MINN. L. REV. 1537 (2006) [hereinafter Hickman, The Need for Mead] (arguing that the 
Chevron/Mead framework should apply to Treasury regulations); Kristin E. Hickman, 
Coloring Outside the Lines: Examining Treasury’s (Lack of) Compliance with Administrative 
Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1727 (2007) [hereinafter 
Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines] (studying the Treasury’s failure to comply with the 
APA-required pattern).  
 10 See Mayo, 562 U.S. at 54 (“Although we have not thus far distinguished between 
National Muffler and Chevron, they call for different analyses of an ambiguous statute.”). 
 11 See INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1(3), available at http://www.irs.gov/ 
irm/part32/irm_32-001-005.html#d0e347 (“Although most IRS/Treasury regulations are 
interpretative, and therefore not subject to the notice-and-comment provisions of the APA, the 
Service usually solicits public comment when it promulgates a rule.”).  
 12 See infra Part III.A.2.  Under the APA, a “rule” is “the whole or a part of an agency 
statement of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to implement, 
interpret, or prescribe law or policy or describing the organization, procedure, or practice 
requirements of an agency.”  5 U.S.C. § 551(4) (2012).  An adjudication, on the other hand, is 
the process for “the formulation of an order.”  Id. § 551(7).  An “order” is “the whole or a part of 
a final disposition . . . in a matter other than rule making.”  Id. § 551(6).  Adjudication is thus 
a residual category where an action does not constitute rulemaking. 
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comments.13  In other situations, the IRS and Treasury have 
issued immediately effective temporary regulations with 
comments to follow, before finalizing regulations.14  The IRS and 
Treasury sometimes issue rules designed to affect pending 
litigation, and occasionally issue rules with retroactive effect.15  
The IRS has claimed that most tax regulations are interpretative 
and accordingly exempt from APA notice and comment rulemaking 
procedures.16  Indeed, even post-Mayo, the IRS continues to 
assume that most tax regulations will qualify as interpretative.17  
Moreover, the IRS issues a substantial amount of subregulatory 
guidance without soliciting comments from the public.18  
Taxpayers are generally subject to penalties for negligence or 
disregard of regulations and other published subregulatory 
guidance.19   
                                                                                                                   
 13 See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 9, at 1736–37 (noting that the 
Treasury maintains that “most” of its regulations are “interpretative” and do not require 
notice-and-comment). 
 14 See id. at 1748–49 (finding that the Treasury issued legally-binding temporary 
regulations simultaneously with a notice of proposed rulemaking for 36.2% of projects from 
2003–05). 
 15 In a post-Mayo tax controversy, the Supreme Court had an opportunity to provide 
guidance with respect to questions surrounding litigation oriented and retroactive tax 
regulations, but did not address such issues because it found the statute unambiguous.  See 
United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836, 1842–44 (2012); Puckett, 
supra note 3, at 372 (noting that after Home Concrete, “it remains unclear what the Court 
thinks about validity of and deference applicable to temporary regulations in general, or 
retroactive temporary regulations in particular”).  
 16 See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 9, at 1729; see also 5 U.S.C. 
§ 553(b)(3)(A) (exempting interpretative rules from informal rulemaking procedures). 
 17 INTERNAL REVENUE MANUAL, supra note 11, § 32.1.5.4.7.5.1(2).  The IRS’s logic tracks 
the leading distinction in case law that there is a continuum between new rules and 
interpretations of law: 
[M]ost IRS/Treasury regulations will be interpretative regulations because 
they fill gaps in legislation or have a prior existence in the law . . . [and] the 
underlying Internal Revenue Code section imposing the tax or providing for 
collection of a tax will provide an adequate legislative basis for the action in 
the regulations. 
Id. 
 18 See Hickman, Coloring Outside the Lines, supra note 9, at 1804 (describing methods 
used by the IRS to give taxpayers guidance, other than regulation). 
 19 See I.R.C. § 6662(b) (2012) (listing categories of underpayments of tax that are subject 
to penalties); see also Hickman, The Need for Mead, supra note 9, at 1605 (noting that 
Congress used the same “rules and regulations” terminology in section 6662 (imposing 
penalties) as in section 7805 (granting authority to the IRS and Treasury to issue 
guidance)). 
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Mayo provides a general principle but its precise holding is that 
a notice and comment tax regulation should be analyzed under the 
familiar two-step Chevron20 framework rather than the less 
deferential multifactor National Muffler21 tax decision.22  
Accordingly, questions remain as to what tax rules qualify as 
“interpretative,” the validity of temporary tax regulations, and 
what deference courts should apply when reviewing tax rules, 
whether regulations or subregulatory guidance, that were issued 
without following the APA’s notice and comment procedures.  
To think critically about the implications of Mayo for tax, one 
must take a step back from tax administration and think about 
non-tax administrative law.  A typical administrative agency 
combines prospective rulemaking, enforcement, and retroactive 
adjudicatory powers under one umbrella.23  This structure 
presents a potential for an agency to overreach or abuse power.  
Ordinarily, however, without specific evidence of actual bias, no 
serious constitutional issue arises: 
 The contention that the combination of investigative 
and adjudicative functions necessarily creates an 
unconstitutional risk of bias in administrative 
adjudication has a much more difficult burden of 
persuasion to carry.  It must overcome a presumption 
of honesty and integrity in those serving as 
adjudicators; and it must convince that, under a 
                                                                                                                   
 20 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
 21 Nat’l Muffler Dealers Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 440 U.S. 472 (1979). 
 22 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57 (2011) 
(“Chevron . . . rather than National Muffler . . . provide[s] the appropriate framework for 
evaluating the full-time employee rule.”). 
 23 See Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991) 
(“Under most regulatory schemes, rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudicative powers are 
combined in a single administrative authority.” (exemplifying with the Federal Trade 
Commission, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Communications 
Commission)); John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency 
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 612, 638 (1996) (noting that the “typical 
administrative agency has power not only to adopt ‘legislative’ rules, but also to enforce 
those rules and to adjudicate cases arising under them”); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, 
Deconstructing Independent Agencies (and Executive Agencies), 98 CORNELL L. REV. 769, 
808–09 (2013) (showing that a survey of agencies “confirms an assertion fairly common in 
the literature that the authority to proceed through adjudication is common and not limited 
to agencies with statutory removal protection”).   
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realistic appraisal of psychological tendencies and 
human weakness, conferring investigative and 
adjudicative powers on the same individuals poses 
such a risk of actual bias or prejudgment that the 
practice must be forbidden if the guarantee of due 
process is to be adequately implemented.24 
Thus, administrative agencies routinely promulgate rules, bring 
suit to enforce those rules, and adjudicate controversies.25  
Moreover, recent research has persuasively challenged a 
commonly held understanding that the modern administrative 
state represents a fall from grace tolerable only because of 
necessity and changed circumstances.26  
Tax administration, however, is anything but typical.  Indeed, it 
contrasts starkly with the APA, including both seemingly pro-
taxpayer and anti-taxpayer departures from the APA template.27  
A potentially powerful protection for taxpayers is the vesting of 
formal adjudicatory powers primarily in the courts rather than the 
IRS.28  This protection stacks up against several taxpayer-
resistant structural features. 
The Code permits tax rules to take effect retroactively;29 in 
contrast, the Supreme Court has construed the APA to generally 
prohibit agencies from issuing rules with a retroactive effective 
date.30  Although a retroactive rule does not quite find facts in a 
controversy, it can have quasi-adjudicatory effects by prescribing 
                                                                                                                   
 24 Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 47 (1975). 
 25 Formal adjudication is subject to various procedural safeguards in the APA, limiting, 
among other things, ex parte contact, providing for independence of the presiding officer, 
and requiring decisions to be based on the record.  Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. 
§§ 554(d), 556(b), (d) (2012). 
 26 See infra Part II.A. 
 27 See infra Part III. 
 28 This unduly simplifies the labyrinthine tax litigation process.  For a more thorough 
description, see Part III.B. 
 29 I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012). 
 30 See Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 208 (1988).  In Bowen, the Court 
explained, “Retroactivity is not favored in the law.  Thus, congressional enactments and 
administrative rules will not be construed to have retroactive effect unless their language 
requires this result.”  Id.  Moreover, “[b]y the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative 
rulemaking authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encompass the power 
to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power is conveyed by Congress in express 
terms.” Id. 
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rules of decision with the benefit of hindsight.  Moreover, subject 
to very narrow exceptions, the Code and the Declaratory Judgment 
Act generally compel taxpayers to challenge Treasury Regulations 
only post-enforcement.31  Accordingly, unlike most regulated 
parties, taxpayers cannot generally vet their position in court 
without risking additional tax liability and may view procedural 
resistance as futile.32  In sum, the structure of tax rulemaking 
makes it far more difficult to defuse tax collection through 
procedural challenges, but the Code denies the IRS the ability to 
find the facts and set the record in the first instance.33 
Because the Code supplants the APA in these important ways, 
the death knells for tax exceptionalism should be quite muffled.  
Yet the literature has failed adequately to focus on how the overall 
structure of tax administration, rulemaking, and adjudication 
articulate together and could possibly account for one another.34  A 
more balanced treatment shows that the structure as a whole 
promotes equal treatment of similar taxpayers, affords taxpayers 
an opportunity for individualized justice, and promotes the 
production of guidance for taxpayers.  To be sure, there are 
alternatives; however, this Article insists that other 
administrative structures would entail a mix of gains and losses 
compared to the status quo.  
This Article argues that it is misleading to declare the death of 
tax exceptionalism and that structural tax exceptionalism may have 
important benefits.  Part II provides a brief historical overview of 
the rise of federal agency administration of statutes and especially 
tax laws.  The history tends to detract from anti-tax and anti-
                                                                                                                   
 31 See I.R.C. § 7421 (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2012). 
 32 See Kristin E. Hickman, A Problem of Remedy: Responding to Treasury’s (Lack of) 
Compliance with Administrative Procedure Act Rulemaking Requirements, 76 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 1153, 1193 (2008) (positing that “taxpayers may perceive that challenging temporary 
Treasury regulations on APA procedural grounds is a futile act not worth the effort”). 
 33 This tendency toward court adjudication rather than administrative adjudication may 
increase the overall costs of adjudicating tax controversies without providing offsetting 
benefits.  See Mirit Eyal-Cohen, Preventive Tax Policy: Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor’s Tax 
Philosophy, 22–25 (UCLA Sch. of Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Research 
Paper No. 07-27, 2007), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1010484 (describing Justice 
Traynor and Stanley S. Surrey’s proposal to increase inexpensive administrative solutions 
to tax disputes).  
 34 See, e.g., Hickman, supra note 3, at 470 (“I limit my analysis of the relationship 
between Chevron deference and the force of law to the rulemaking sphere and defer 
considering agency adjudication.”). 
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agency rhetoric that counsel disempowering the Treasury 
Department and other administrative agencies from 
comprehensively enforcing laws and making policy in their relevant 
domains.  Moreover, structural tax exceptionalism may be 
explained in part as an accident of its earlier roots and the unique 
historical development of the tax administration compared to 
administrative agencies in general.35  Part III analyzes how the 
Code’s structure for tax administration differs from the APA 
template for administrative agencies.  Some of the most important 
differences include an arguably pro-taxpayer, court-centered 
adjudication pathway;36 meanwhile, the IRS and Treasury are 
vested with greater flexibility in promulgating guidance than the 
typical administrative agency, and judicial interference with tax 
administration is quite limited until attempted collection.37  Part IV 
deconstructs these differences, drawing from general administrative 
law scholarship to identify potential advantages and drawbacks of 
structural tax exceptionalism.  This Article concludes by 
recommending caution before dismantling the exceptional features 
of tax administration.  It is undeniable that the current tax system 
is imperfect, but it is unclear that turning the structure of tax 
administration on its head—and thereby taking on the problems of 
a typical administrative agency—will improve tax administration.  
II.  HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
This Part summarizes the rise of federal agency administration, 
including tax collection.  This discussion serves two purposes.  First, 
situating tax administration in historical context anticipates a 
fundamental question that some inside the tax community would 
naturally ask: Whether today’s administrative landscape is 
radically different and unrecognizable from that of the Framers and 
accordingly illegitimate.  Though it has been developed elsewhere in 
both general administrative law scholarship and in tax scholarship, 
this history is not well known in the tax bar, and some reflexive 
hostility to Chevron and Mayo likely derive from mistaken 
                                                                                                                   
 35 See infra Part II.B–C. 
 36 See infra Part III.B.3. 
 37 See infra Part III.A.2–3. 
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assumptions about the history.38  Second, the historical background 
helps to explain the unusual structure of tax administration today; 
deeper roots and distinctive problems arguably have led to an 
exceptional structure of tax administration. 
A.  THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 
Even with the APA as a “bill of rights for the new regulatory 
state,”39 legal scholars have raised serious criticisms of the 
constitutionality of the modern administrative state.40  Broadly 
conceived, the APA provides the public with procedural rights, 
input into the regulatory process, and ensures that a record exists 
for adequate judicial review.  Nevertheless, critics such as Gary 
Lawson have decried the “bloodless constitutional revolution”41: 
The constitutional separation of powers is a means to 
safeguard the liberty of the people.  In Madison’s 
famous words, “[t]he accumulation of all powers, 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same 
hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether 
hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be 
pronounced the very definition of tyranny.”  The 
destruction of this principle of separation of powers is 
perhaps the crowning jewel of the modern 
administrative revolution.  Administrative agencies 
routinely combine all three governmental functions in 
the same body, and even in the same people within 
that body.42 
                                                                                                                   
 38 See Hickman, supra note 3, at 532 (“Tax practitioners are already dismayed by the 
power they perceive the Mayo decision has given to Treasury to dictate legal outcomes.”). 
 39 George B. Shepherd, Fierce Compromise: The Administrative Procedure Act Emerges 
from New Deal Politics, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 1557, 1558 (1996). 
 40 See infra notes 41–44 and accompanying text. 
 41 Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1231, 
1231 (1994). 
 42 Id. at 1248 (footnotes omitted).  Approving of New Deal criticism, Cass Sunstein similarly 
observed that the New Deal “altered the constitutional system in ways so fundamental as to 
suggest that something akin to a constitutional amendment had taken place.”  Cass R. 
Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421, 447–48 (1987).  
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As John McGinnis explains, “over time, special interests have 
urged Congress to grant broad delegations of legislative power to 
agencies whose rulemaking processes can be captured more 
readily than the complicated and burdensome legislative 
process.”43  According to this fall from grace narrative, “The rise of 
the modern administrative state has created the possibility of 
massive substitution of administrative discretion for the original 
restraints of bicameralism and presentment.”44  This critique need 
not be repeated here at length.  
Such longstanding originalist critiques of administrative 
tyranny and illegitimacy have suffered an impactful blow in Jerry 
Mashaw’s historical analysis of the rise of the administrative 
state.45  Professor Mashaw examines the understudied first 
hundred years of federal administration, including tax collection 
and other government functions.46  Mashaw uncovers a decidedly 
pragmatic bent to federal administration of tax and other law: 
There simply never was a time in which federal public 
law was self-executing, fully specified by Congress, and 
enforced through judicial decree.  Nor was there a time 
when administrative officials were directly under the 
control of the President and subject to his direction in 
all matters great or small.  To the extent that we model 
our contemporary jurisprudence on the idea that the 
administrative state is sad evidence of the decline of 
American democracy and the rule of law, we imagine a 
non-administrative state that never was. . . .  The 
American administrative constitution has been a 
continuous experiment in institutional design that has 
sought, through a host of differing techniques, to 
                                                                                                                   
 43 John O. McGinnis, Presidential Review as Constitutional Restoration, 51 DUKE L.J. 
901, 916 (2001) (arguing that the expansion of agency discretion offers an opportunity to 
circumvent bicameralism and presentment). 
 44 See id. at 917 (noting that agency heads, not the President, issue most regulations 
under authority from Congress). 
 45 See generally JERRY L. MASHAW, CREATING THE ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTITUTION: THE 
LOST ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW (2012) (dispelling the 
“myths” that led to these critiques). 
 46 Id. at 5, 17–25, 34–37. 
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accommodate administrative efficacy to multiple 
conceptions of democracy and the rule of law.47 
Accordingly, to the extent that proponents of administrative 
flexibility have conceded on history and justified modern agencies 
on grounds of necessity, they appear to have conceded too much.  
As Mashaw writes, “We tell ourselves stories about the modern 
administrative state that unduly delegitimate its constitutional 
status and mislead us to some degree about the sources of 
administrative law that might provide the building blocks for 
effective reforms.”48   
Mashaw synthesizes several “patterns of pragmatism” in the 
early history of the United States that are contrary to the 
narrative that modern administrative governance constitutes a 
departure in kind from the practices of the earliest Congresses.49  
First, administration was not always “lodged in departments and 
accountable directly and exclusively to the President.”50  Second, 
though Congress sometimes “micromanaged administration,”51 
delegation was more common; indeed, “many early statutes not 
only required public administration, they were almost devoid of 
policy direction.”52  This left to administrative officials the space to 
govern through “general rules and by the adjudication of countless 
claims and disputes.”53  
Notwithstanding the relative specificity of early revenue laws, 
customs administration illustrates the practical limits of statutory 
                                                                                                                   
 47 Id. at 312. 
 48 Id. at 286; see also id. at 288 & 409 n.8 (“By the end of the Second World War America 
had created a large administrative state that was believed by some, particularly leaders of 
the American Bar Association, to be lurching toward tyranny. . . . Similarly, agencies’ 
combination of legislative, executive, and judicial functions struck many as dangerously 
aggrandizing executive power and creating the potential for bias and prejudgment in 
administrative determinations.”). 
 49 “Commentators relentlessly bemoan the loss of political or popular control over 
administration that they associate with the Republic’s first hundred years.”  Id. at 50, 308. 
 50 Id. at 50–51. 
 51 Id. at 44.  As an example of micromanagement, Congress enacted a “detailed and 
complex” excise tax collection system with respect to distilled spirits in 1791.  Id. at 37.  The 
statute “occupies fifteen pages in the Statutes at Large and specifies everything from the 
brand of hydrometer to be used in testing proof to the exact lettering to be used . . . to 
identify revenue offices.”  Id. at 44. 
 52 Id. at 51. 
 53 Id. 
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specificity—even in a tax system that was much simpler than the 
current regime:  
Statutes could specify the level of the tax and on what it 
should be levied.  But when objective tests, such as 
proof measured by a specific type of hydrometer, were 
not feasible, judgment by revenue officers was 
inevitable concerning the nature or grade of the articles 
taxed and their value.  Administrative discretion was 
also required precisely to avoid the injustice of rigid 
application of highly specific statutory requirements.  
Tax collectors, for example, were given the power to 
excuse offenses when there had been “substantial 
compliance” or no “intent to defraud,” or when a 
violation was caused by unavoidable circumstances.54 
Thus, the administration of customs duties belies the notion that 
“early congressional practice establishes a narrow view of what 
could constitutionally be delegated to administrative officials.”55  
Ironically enough, tax administration seems to have been from the 
beginning both exceptional and unexceptional: vast discretion 
turned out to be inherent even in a highly specified system. 
Importantly, “the specificity of revenue and postal statutes was 
in many ways exceptional.”56  But even then, as noted above, 
delegation, discretion, and pragmatic function took hold, and not 
just in tax administration.  As a non-tax example, the postal 
service is instructive in largely the same way as customs.  Pro-
delegation and anti-delegation factions in Congress quarreled over 
the specificity of the design of the postal service, and the anti-
delegation faction declared a limited victory with careful 
specification of stations and rates.57  Nevertheless, the Postmaster 
General garnered substantial discretion to create additional post 
roads, enter into contracts for mail carriage, and regulate the acts 
of subordinates.58  Mashaw also notes that the three-member 
                                                                                                                   
 54 Id. at 45. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. at 46. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
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Patent Office was perhaps the first independent commission, 
consisting of the Attorney General, Secretary of State, and 
Secretary of War; this “board of eminent political appointees” 
exercised quasi-judicial powers.59 
Much of the foregoing structural analysis would not necessarily 
shock or alter the conclusions of a pragmatic or functionalist 
defender of the modern administrative state.60  But Mashaw’s 
work suggests that pragmatists should be less apologetic, and 
originalists should be less hostile to the delegation and deference 
trends with respect to modern agencies.   
Mashaw’s work also reaffirms that the scope of judicial review 
of agency action has become broader, while standards of review 
have often become more deferential.  Acknowledging that judicial 
review was indeed very different, Mashaw takes issue with 
Frederic Lee’s critique61 of the effectiveness of early judicial review 
of administrative action.62  A full menu of common law forms of 
action was available to contest much administrative action.63  
Unlike today’s administrative practice—where lawsuits target the 
government and injunctive and declaratory relief are the norm—
administrative challenges in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries were against the administrator in his personal capacity, 
and damages were the norm.64  Meanwhile, courts restricted 
mandamus relief to non-discretionary matters in a very strict 
                                                                                                                   
 59 Id. at 50. 
 60 See Sunstein, supra note 42, at 451 (“The goals of limited government and stability, 
originally of considerable importance to the distribution of national powers, provide the 
least compelling justification for a return to the original constitutional framework.  The 
reasons are both practical and conceptual.”). 
 61 See Frederic P. Lee, The Origins of Judicial Control of Federal Executive Action, 36 GEO. 
L.J. 287, 291 (1948) (asking rhetorically: “The right to collateral review through the relatively 
unimportant common law remedies, such as trover, detinue, assumpsit, and replevin, against 
executive officers who had acted in excess of their jurisdiction, was not questioned.  But could 
their actions be directly reviewed by the courts through mandamus, injunction or appeal?”). 
 62 See MASHAW, supra note 45, at 76 (“To take the breadth issue first, is Frederic Lee 
correct that the common law remedies left too much official action outside the scope of 
effective judicial review?  As to the Federalist period, my hesitant conclusion is ‘not 
really.’ ”); see also id. at 308 (“And, they by and large view judicial review as nonexistent 
until the early twentieth century.”). 
 63 See id. at 76 (“A host of standard common law actions . . . were available to test the 
legality of these official actions.”). 
 64 See id. at 75–76. 
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sense;65 accordingly, policy review such as we have internalized 
today was virtually non-existent.66 
Courts generally reviewed administrative action on a de novo 
basis, provided that the plaintiff could state a common law claim 
against an administrator.67  To be sure, there were some 
exceptional categories where no common law action would lie,68 
and in exceptional cases such as land patents courts applied a “res 
judicata” model allowing for very little substantive review,69 but 
generally the prospect of defending a lawsuit constrained 
administrative action.70 
In the tax context, the structure and incentives were again 
somewhat exceptional.  Customs agents and other tax enforcement 
agents, like many other administrative agents at the time, worked 
in part on commission.71  Though collectors potentially faced 
common law claims in state court, they were shielded by an 
unusual statutory defense of reasonable cause, and could recoup 
doubled legal fees from unsuccessful plaintiffs.72  On the other 
hand, fact finding would take place before a potentially hostile 
state court or jury.73  The possibility of a suit in an unfriendly 
state court could be debilitating to collection efforts.74  Though it is 
unclear how well the protective features worked, in a back of the 
envelope manner the incentives could be seen as roughly balanced 
between deterring administrative corruption and tax evasion.75 
                                                                                                                   
 65 Id. at 302. 
 66 See id. at 308 (observing that “the willingness of modern courts, at the behest of 
modern Congresses, to insert themselves into the policy processes of administrative decision 
making represents the most substantial change in our administrative constitution over 
these 200-plus years”). 
 67 See id. at 302 (“[T]o the extent that courts were presented with common law actions 
against federal officers, they exercised de novo review.”). 
 68 See id. at 77 (noting that while denial of a ship license or passport might not be 
reviewable, the area was “noncontentious”).  
 69 Id.   
 70 Id. at 136–43. 
 71 Id. at 61; see also NICHOLAS R. PARILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE, THE SALARY 
REVOLUTION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 192–94 (2013). 
 72 MASHAW, supra note 45, at 73. 
 73 Id. at 71–73. 
 74 See id. (describing a case of state court tax nullification).  As Mashaw puts it, “Judicial 
review in a de novo form could be enormously intrusive, indeed paralyzing, at the hands of 
nineteenth-century courts and juries.”  Id. at 308. 
 75 See id. at 73. 
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The standard narrative roots administrative agencies in the 
Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC)76 created in 1887.77  As 
Mashaw has documented, an explosion of administrative activity 
began somewhat earlier, with Congress granting “virtual carte 
blanche” to agencies with respect to quarantines, steamboat 
regulation, and pre-ICC railroad regulation.78  Substantial growth 
(for example, the Federal Trade Commission) of federal agencies 
continued into the early twentieth century even with conservatives 
in power.79  The Great Depression spurred the creation of 
administrative agencies.80  Under Roosevelt, “[a]n avalanche of 
new federal agencies and commissions — including the National 
Recovery Administration, the NLRB, and the SEC — reached ever 
more broadly into a free market that appeared to have failed.”81 
In the early twentieth century, judicial review also took first 
steps toward a system recognizably like our modern system.  In 
particular, “mandamus jurisprudence nevertheless reflected 
movement toward reconceptualizing direct judicial review as a 
public action designed to control official behavior rather than as a 
private lawsuit between individuals, one of whom happened to 
occupy a public office.”82  However, change toward a public action 
was “incremental and began inauspiciously.”83   
According to Louis Jaffe’s account,84 the Supreme Court crafted 
a presumption of reviewability for administrative action in the 
1902 case American School of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty.85  
Despite the long history of a bimodal (all or nothing) judicial 
review model, the Court concluded that the “acts of all . . . officers 
must be justified by some law, and in case an official violates the 
law to the injury of an individual the courts generally have 
                                                                                                                   
 76 See, e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Federal Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. 
REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1986). 
 77 MASHAW, supra note 45, at 4 (quoting LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN 
LAW 439 (2d ed. 1985)). 
 78 Id. at 240–44. 
 79 See Shepherd, supra note 39, at 1561–62. 
 80 Id. at 1561. 
 81 Id. at 1562. 
 82 MASHAW, supra note 45, at 245. 
 83 Id.  
 84 LOUIS L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 327–53 (1965). 
 85 187 U.S. 94 (1902); JAFFE, supra note 84, at 339. 
GEORGIA LAW  REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2015  11:46 AM 
2015] STRUCTURAL TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 1083 
 
jurisdiction to grant relief.”86  From this precedent, judicial review 
gradually evolved to a more recognizable state.87 
It would take numerous failed attempts at legislation dating 
from 1929 before Congress and President Truman enacted the 
APA.88  Conservatives and liberals had vastly different views of 
how much control to impose on agencies.89  Court challenges to 
administrative schemes met with some success, but ultimately the 
Supreme Court witnessed the famous “switch in time that saved 
nine.”90  Finally, in 1946, the APA was signed into law; it has been 
“profound and durable” yet leaves many unanswered questions 
because legislators could only agree on intentionally ambiguous 
language with respect to fundamental principles (e.g., legislative 
versus interpretative rules), the meaning of which would 
ultimately be resolved by courts.91  Part III begins with a brief 
overview of those concepts. 
B.  DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL TAX ADMINISTRATION 
As mentioned in Part II.A, from the eighteenth century until the 
early twentieth century, the government raised revenue primarily 
from customs supplemented with internal excise taxes.92  The 
predecessor to the modern income tax was a modest and 
temporary income tax (along with an inheritance tax) enacted to 
                                                                                                                   
 86 Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing, 187 U.S. at 108. 
 87 See JAFFE, supra note 84, at 120–51 (detailing the evolution of the Court’s primary 
jurisdiction to review agency decisions); see also Reuel E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: 
Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 
399, 408 (2007) (noting that courts began to defer to agency determinations in subject 
matters clearly within traditional notions of the police power, but scrutinized agency 
determinations at the outer edge of the police power more closely). 
 88 See generally Shepherd, supra note 39 (detailing several failed bills leading up to the 
eventual compromise of the APA). 
 89 See Schiller, supra note 87, at 423–25 (discussing conservative support for “adequate 
checks upon administrative action” that would have resulted from the failed Walter-Logan 
Bill). 
 90 See Shepherd, supra note 39, at 1562–63 (discussing Justice Roberts’s switch to 
ultimately supporting New Deal programs and agencies). 
 91 See id. at 1662–66, 1678–83 (describing the ambiguous “compromise” and “scramble” of 
both sides to create legislative history to support their desired interpretation). 
 92 See infra Part II.B; supra Part II.A (discussing the early administration of customs); see 
also Erik M. Jensen, The Taxing Power, The Sixteenth Amendment, and the Meaning of 
“Incomes,” 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1057, 1091–92 (2001) (arguing that income tax arose in response 
to the inadequacy and unfairness of early consumption taxes). 
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help finance the Civil War, first in 1861 and amended in 1862.93  
“From a revenue perspective, the income tax was less important 
than the comprehensive system of excise taxes included in the 
1862 act, as well as its inheritance tax and levies on a wide range 
of business activities.”94  
The 1862 Act established the Office of Commissioner and the 
Bureau of Internal Revenue within the Treasury Department.95  
The Bureau administered remaining internal revenue taxes even 
after the repeal of the Civil War income tax.96  The Bureau 
initially operated through 185 geographical districts, each with a 
presidentially appointed assessor and collector.97  A large group of 
unappointed subordinates quickly were hired.98  The Civil War 
income tax left many concepts vague; accordingly, the 
Commissioner had responsibility for implementing regulations as 
well as enforcing the law.99 
Although collections could be described as a success, it is not 
entirely surprising that the first attempt at implementation of a 
federal income tax was antagonistic: 
But all was not well in the Bureau.  The collection 
system was inherently adversarial, prompting 
considerable tension between officials and taxpayers.  
The sweeping powers that devolved upon field staff, 
especially assistant assessors, exacerbated this 
problem.  Both outside critics and agency officials 
complained that poorly trained and inadequately 
compensated personnel had hobbled the agency.100 
In short, the administration of the tax was “inquisitorial,” 
something tolerable in a time of crisis but less tolerable in normal 
times.101  Another feature contributing to the tax’s unpopularity 
                                                                                                                   
 93 See Joseph J. Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative 
History, 53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 719–22 (2001) (discussing the 1861 and 1862 income taxes). 
 94 Id. at 722. 
 95 Id. at 723. 
 96 Id. 
 97 Id. 
 98 Id. at 724 & n.19. 
 99 Id. at 724. 
 100 Id. at 725–26. 
 101 Id. at 726–27. 
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was publicity of tax returns.102  Although publicity would seem to 
be an excellent way of enforcing compliance by indirectly involving 
neighbors, resentment against the practice led to its later reversal 
by Congress in 1870.103  Finally, the low pay rate for Bureau 
employees contributed to serious problems of staff turnover, 
incompetence, and corruption.104 
Despite an inquiry from a special commission on the topic of tax 
administration and law, only modest staffing changes were made 
in 1866.105  The Civil War income tax eventually expired after 
1871, but the Bureau remained in largely the same form to 
administer remaining internal excise taxes, which would—along 
with customs duties—provide the bulk of federal revenue until 
World War I.106  After an 1894 attempt to tax income, which was 
rejected by the Supreme Court as an unconstitutional direct tax 
lacking apportionment,107 the next federal income tax was enacted 
in 1913 after the ratification of the Sixteenth Amendment.108  With 
astronomical growth in revenue came problems of delayed 
processing of returns and appeals, along with familiar allegations 
of corruption and favoritism.109  
                                                                                                                   
 102 Id. at 727. 
 103 Id. at 727–28. 
 104 See id. at 728 (discussing the problems caused by Bureau employees’ low pay).  Frederic 
Howe, writing in the late nineteenth century, explained the hostile reception to the Civil War 
experiment with an income tax:  
The income tax has always been unpopular with certain classes.  It is indicted 
as invading the sanctity of the most private affairs, as being inseparable from 
inquisitorial scrutiny into business relations, and an insufferable intrusion 
into those affairs of the individual which are in a sense sacred, and which in 
the past had been exempted from the visits of the tax-gatherer.  It is further 
alleged that a tax which offers such opportunities for evasion is a charge upon 
honesty and patriotism, and a premium upon perjury. 
FREDERIC C. HOWE, TAXATION AND TAXES IN THE UNITED STATES UNDER THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE SYSTEM 1791–1895: AN HISTORICAL SKETCH OF THE ORGANIZATION, DEVELOPMENT, 
AND LATER MODIFICATION OF DIRECT AND EXCISE TAXATION UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 95–96 
(1896). 
 105 See Thorndike, supra note 93, at 733 (explaining that the principal change in the 
Bureau’s organization was “more adequate” staffing). 
 106 Id. at 734. 
 107 Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429, 583–86 (1895), modified on reh’g, 
158 U.S. 601, 637 (1895). 
 108 Thorndike, supra note 93, at 740. 
 109 See id. at 743–50 (discussing the inefficiencies and resulting criticisms of the Bureau 
during and after World War I). 
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One criticism of the Bureau that may partially explain the 
unusual features of modern tax rulemaking110 was that the lack of 
tax guidance led to unfairness, personnel turnover, favoritism, and 
corruption.111  A special commission found a direct connection 
between secrecy and tax inequity: 
 Indeed, secrecy was as a recurring complaint in the 
committee’s report.  The panel pointed out that Bureau 
personnel and taxpayers confronted a dearth of 
published guidance and regulations.  “This failure to 
promulgate and publish the principles and practices to 
be followed in determining tax liability has resulted in 
gross discrimination between taxpayers similarly 
situated[,]” the report stated.112  
Moreover, the lack of guidance not only led to inequity between 
similarly situated taxpayers; it also amplified the revolving door 
effect, whereby insiders with valuable knowledge would leave for 
lucrative private employment, while the Bureau would be left with 
inadequate, poorly trained personnel.113 
Even after another special commission investigated these 
problems, and bitter frictions between Congress and Secretary of 
the Treasury Andrew Mellon surfaced, Congress failed to enact 
any fundamental reforms.114  More sweeping reform would not 
take place until the 1950s.115  
                                                                                                                   
 110 See infra Part III.A (describing the unusual features of tax rulemaking). 
 111 See Thorndike, supra note 93, at 751–52 (describing complaints of taxpayer oppression 
and Bureau corruption). 
 112 Id. at 751 (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-27, at 229 (1926)). 
 113 Thorndike explains the dynamic thus: 
 Rulings were known only to insiders, including affected taxpayers, their 
representatives, and relevant BIR employees.  As the committee report 
observed, “This system has created, as a favored class of taxpayers, those 
who have employed ‘tax experts.’  It has created a special class of tax 
practitioners, whose sole stock in trade is a knowledge of the secret 
methods and practices of the Income Tax Unit.”  Knowledge of secret 
precedents had made Bureau employees extremely valuable to corporate 
taxpayers, fostering a damaging rate of turnover.  Only the regular 
publication of BIR decisions could halt this outflow and ensure equal 
treatment for all taxpayers. 
Id. (footnote omitted) (quoting S. REP. NO. 69-27, at 235 (1926)). 
 114 See id. at 751–52.  Thorndike identifies only one lasting benefit of these inquiries and 
debates:  
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Interspersed with this history of the IRS, however, is the 
history of adjudication of tax controversies.  As discussed 
previously, taxpayers originally had to sue—through an implied 
common law action against the collector—for a refund of a 
disputed tax; in other words, there was no analog to the modern 
Tax Court in which a taxpayer may challenge a deficiency without 
first paying.116  Initially, this “pay first, argue later” system was 
not thought to be unduly burdensome (or perhaps it was thought 
to be necessary for effective enforcement); however, when tax rates 
rose in the early twentieth century, demands grew for a pre-
collection tribunal.117  
In response to these concerns, Congress ultimately created 
within the Bureau of Internal Revenue a Committee on Appeals and 
Review to hear pre-collection disputes.118  The public, however, was 
quick to call for a more independent body.119  Somewhat predictably, 
taxpayers perceived a pro-revenue bias from the Committee.120  
Moreover, concerns emerged that powerful, politically-connected 
taxpayers might receive favors through the agency.121 
Congress created the independent Board of Tax Appeals in 
1924.122  After some tinkering with the scope of appellate review, 
Congress largely left the Board alone until the 1940s.123  In the 
Revenue Act of 1942, Congress renamed the tribunal the Tax Court 
of the United States, presumably because the board exercised only 
                                                                                                                   
In 1926, Congress adopted Couzens’s recommendation for a permanent 
committee to monitor the revenue system, including the BIR.  This 
committee, known as the Joint Committee on Internal Taxation, soon 
became a leading repository of expertise on federal taxation and a close 
partner of the Treasury Department in shaping tax policy. 
Id. at 752.  
 115 See infra notes 133–35 and accompanying text. 
 116 See HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 20–
21 (1979) (discussing the history of taxpayer administrative hearings). 
 117 See Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax Court Exempt from Administrative Law 
Jurisprudence When Acting As a Reviewing Court?, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 603, 617 (2010) 
(discussing how the rise in tax rates led to the demand for a pre-collection tribunal). 
 118 See DUBROFF, supra note 116, at 39 (describing how the Committee grew out of initial, 
intentionally temporary review boards). 
 119 Id. at 43–45. 
 120 Id. at 41–45. 
 121 See id. (noting the public’s suspicion of large tax refunds made by the Bureau). 
 122 Revenue Act of 1924, ch. 234, § 900, 43 Stat. 336, 336–38 (1924). 
 123 DUBROFF, supra note 116, at 175; Fahey, supra note 117, at 631 n.52. 
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judicial functions.124  Despite the seemingly minor change, this 
sparked debate concerning whether the Tax Court was really a 
court or an agency and which designation would be more 
misleading.125  On the one hand, the Board had only judicial 
functions, but it was still not an Article III court whose judges 
served with life tenure and salary protection under the 
Constitution.126  Moreover, some were concerned that the new 
nomenclature would be a slippery slope toward Article III status.127 
For a brief interlude, as a result of Dobson v. Commissioner,128 
the Tax Court’s findings of fact on appeal were reviewable on a 
deferential basis as compared to district court findings of fact.129  
The rationale for the Dobson decision was simple—the Tax Court 
was just like any other agency, not a “court” under Article III, and 
thus entitled to more deference than a district court.130  This came 
to an end in 1948 when Congress reorganized appellate review of 
Tax Court decisions, ending the heightened deference regime.131  
Under the current § 7482(a), Tax Court decisions are reviewable 
by the United States Courts of Appeals as if they were “decisions 
of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.”132  
Two episodes in tax history finally resulted in major structural 
reforms to the Bureau of Internal Revenue.  First, a series of 
corruption scandals in the 1950s galvanized support to reform the 
Bureau.133  The result was, most importantly, elimination of the 
office of collector and other political appointees below the level of 
Commissioner, in an effort to uproot the influence of political 
connections on collection decisions.134  Moreover, the Bureau took 
on the current name Internal Revenue Service; geographic 
                                                                                                                   
 124 Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957.  
 125 See DUBROFF, supra note 116, at 177–81 (describing both sides of the debate regarding 
the name change generated by the Revenue Act of 1942). 
 126 See Revenue Act of 1942, ch. 619, § 504, 56 Stat. 798, 957 (dictating that the appointment 
and tenure of Tax Court judges would be the same as that of Board of Tax Appeals members). 
 127 See DUBROFF, supra note 116, at 179–80 (outlining arguments of individuals opposed 
to the name change). 
 128 320 U.S. 489 (1943).  
 129 Id. at 500–01. 
 130 Id. at 499. 
 131 Rules of Decision Act of 1948, ch. 646, § 36, 62 Stat. 991, 991–98. 
 132 26 U.S.C. § 7482(a)(1) (2012). 
 133 Thorndike, supra note 93, at 755–59. 
 134 Id. at 760–62. 
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districts organized by type of tax were abandoned in favor of 
regional organization by function—collection, audit, appeal, etc.; 
and the Service added an internal Inspection Service intended to 
prevent future corruption.135 
Second, in the late 1990s, renewed complaints of corruption, 
ineptitude, and heavy handed enforcement tactics ultimately led to 
reform legislation enacted in 1998.136  The core reform was to 
attempt to make the Service more taxpayer-service-oriented.137  
Some of the most important features include procedural 
safeguards in the collection process (collection due process) and 
rules for sanctioning and terminating Service employees.138  
C.  SOME PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS 
With the 1998 reforms, the Service arrived essentially at its 
current structure.  And with this historical background—of both 
the Service and administrative agencies in general—the unusual 
structure of the Service today seems more reasonable.  Compared 
to a typical administrative agency, the Service has deeper roots.  
The origins of review in a common law action against the 
collector—otherwise there would have been no review—point to 
why tax adjudication remains to this day split off from the IRS to 
the courts.  But why has Congress failed to update the IRS to the 
typical agency template?   
Although this Article cannot provide a purposive answer to the 
question, Part IV offers certain policy considerations against Code 
and APA conformity.  It seems especially plausible that 
perceptions of procedural fairness explain why the tax system has 
remained different from the standard agency template.  Indeed, 
even as revenue needs grew at times of national distress, Congress 
did not assign all responsibility for tax administration to an 
executive agency.139  The most dramatic tax law changes have 
                                                                                                                   
 135 Id. at 762–63. 
 136 See id. at 774–75 (discussing the development and eventual passage of the Internal 
Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998). 
 137 See id. at 775 (discussing the Commission’s emphasis on meeting citizens’ needs); 
David J. Herzig, Justice for All: Reimagining the Internal Revenue Service, 33 VA. TAX REV. 
1, 30–32 (2013) (outlining the Act’s “core concept” of viewing the taxpayer as the client).  
 138 See Herzig, supra note 137, at 30 (providing examples of taxpayer protection provisions). 
 139 Thorndike, supra note 93, at 736 (discussing a lack of attention paid to the tax system 
by Congress after World War I). 
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occurred in response to wartime revenue needs,140 yet adjudication 
of controversies remained primarily the province of courts. 
Moreover, even if a risk of overreaching by an agency usually is 
tolerable to achieve the coherency of a unified administration with 
enforcement, rulemaking, and adjudicative power, the calculus 
may be different for the tax system.  Tax compliance directly 
involves perhaps the broadest possible array of individuals and 
businesses in proceedings with an agency that they distrust; 
accordingly, it may simply be politically unrealistic to bestow the 
IRS with more adjudicatory power than it currently exercises.141 
The history of scandal at the Bureau and later the Service should 
not be taken to prove too much about the overarching structural 
features of tax administration.  Certain historical problems could be 
ascribed to lack of funding, lack of public guidance, and 
overpoliticization.  Congress has taken steps toward depoliticizing 
the Service, and, as described in more detail below, to facilitate tax 
rulemaking.142  These steps should help to lessen both the revolving 
door phenomenon and also the potential for corruption.  
Unfortunately, however, the contemporary Congress shows no sign 
of correcting the Service’s historical underfunding problem.143    
III.  CONTRASTING THE MODALITIES OF FEDERAL TAX 
ADMINISTRATION WITH THE APA TEMPLATE 
The Administrative Procedure Act sets forth a template for how 
an agency may take action in formulating and implementing policy 
through rulemaking and adjudication.144  Although organic 
enactments for a particular agency can and do vary the procedural 
requirements and limitations applicable to particular agencies,145 
                                                                                                                   
 140 Herzig, supra note 137, at 1, 8 (noting the reforms after the Civil War and World War I). 
 141 See supra Part II.B (describing the public’s historical suspicion of the Service and 
perceptions of corruption). 
 142 See infra Part III.A.2. 
 143 See George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by Respecting the Public’s Right to 
Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1116 & n.4 (2014) (noting the problems caused by IRS budget 
cuts). 
 144 See infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1. 
 145 See, e.g., Timothy A. Wilkins & Terrell E. Hunt, Agency Discretion and Advances in 
Regulatory Theory: Flexible Agency Approaches Toward the Regulated Community as a 
Model for the Congress-Agency Relationship, 63 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 479, 506–15 (1995) 
(classifying statutory limitations on agency discretion, e.g., purposive limits, subject-matter 
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the APA template serves as a useful comparator for what a true 
end to tax exceptionalism would resemble.  This Part contrasts the 
modalities of tax administration with the APA template, pointing 
out that a striking degree of tax exceptionalism exists in terms of 
the structure of available modalities.  Indeed, the degree of 
exceptionalism arguably overshadows the similarities. 
A.  RULEMAKING 
Under the APA, administrative agencies ordinarily may 
promulgate rules through a relatively informal process.146  The 
required procedure depends on the kind of rule being formulated 
and the organic enactment (e.g., the Internal Revenue Code).  
1.  Rulemaking under the APA.  Promulgation of legislative 
rules—rules that have the force and effect of law—requires the 
enacting agency to undertake notice and comment procedures.147  
These procedures on their face do not sound unduly burdensome: 
an agency must give the public notice of the proposed rulemaking, 
solicit comments, and respond to significant comments.148  
Moreover, the rule ordinarily may take effect no sooner than thirty 
days after publication of the final rule.149  Again, the effective date 
provision seems innocuous on its face, but both the procedures and 
the effective date provision have become significant obstructions to 
agency policymaking as courts have interpreted and applied 
them.150  
Congress most likely intentionally, as a compromise, left the 
definition of key categories of rules—legislative and 
interpretative—vague.151  The doctrine has been unstable over the 
                                                                                                                   
limits, procedural prerequisites and limits, limits on standard setting, and limits on 
regulatory method). 
 146 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2012). 
 147 Id.  Nonlegislative rules (encompassing both interpretative rules and general statements 
of policy) as well as rules of agency organization and procedure are exempt from these 
procedures and require no specific procedural formalities.  Id. § 553(b)(3)(A).  There is also an 
exception for good cause.  Id. § 553(b)(3)(B).  
 148 Id. § 553 (setting forth requirements for informal rulemaking). 
 149 Id. § 553(d).  Exceptions are again made for nonlegislative rules and in situations 
where the agency can show good cause.  See id. § 553(d)(3). 
 150 See generally Murphy, supra note 4 (detailing the creativity of judges in interpreting 
the APA and how this has led to increased procedures for agencies to engage in 
rulemaking). 
 151 See supra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
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years and remains notoriously difficult to apply to particular 
controversies.152  Although there are other candidates, the leading 
test used in the courts appears to be a pragmatic reading of 
“interpretative” that looks to whether the rule interprets rather 
than adds new law, assuming the rule seems fairly binding on the 
agency or the public.153  If the rule is too tentative to be binding on 
the agency or the public, then the rule qualifies as a general 
statement of policy.154  These doctrinal distinctions are laudable 
for adhering to the text of the APA, but arguably do little to 
identify those rules that should or should not be required to 
undergo notice and comment procedures. 
The arbitrary and capricious limitation is a general limitation 
on all agency action—rulemaking or adjudication.155  However, the 
standard is most typically associated with judicial review of 
rulemaking.156  Agencies must make determinations in a rational 
way, considering relevant factors and applying reasonable 
judgment.157  Courts traditionally apply the standard in a highly 
deferential manner.158  However, in the words of then-Professor 
                                                                                                                   
 152 See Hoctor v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 82 F.3d 165, 167 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Distinguishing 
between a ‘legislative’ rule . . . and an interpretive rule . . . is often very difficult—and often 
very important to regulated firms, the public, and the agency.”). 
 153 See Dismas Charities, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 401 F.3d 666, 679 (6th Cir. 2005); 
Warder v. Shalala, 149 F.3d 73, 79–80 (1st Cir. 1998); Hoctor, 82 F.3d at 167, 171–72; cf. 
Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1112 (D.C. Cir. 1993) 
(articulating a four-part test, an important factor of which is “whether in the absence of the 
rule there would not be an adequate legislative basis for enforcement action or other agency 
action to confer benefits or ensure the performance of duties”); Murphy, supra note 4, at 23 
(proposing that courts should be “pragmatic and conservative” rather than “aggressive” in 
their application of notice-and-comment requirements to Treasury rules); Richard J. Pierce, 
Jr., Distinguishing Legislative Rules from Interpretative Rules, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 547, 548 
(2000) (approving of the American Mining Congress factors).  But see Mada-Luna v. 
Fitzpatrick, 813 F.2d 1006, 1015 (9th Cir. 1987) (testing for binding effect on the agency). 
 154 Mada-Luna, 813 F.2d at 1015.  
 155 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). 
 156 See William S. Jordan III, Ossification Revisited: Does Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review Significantly Interfere with Agency Ability to Achieve Regulatory Goals Through 
Informal Rulemaking?, 94 NW. U. L. REV. 393, 394 (2000) (examining whether or not 
judicial review of informal agency rulemaking under the arbitrary and capricious standard 
discourages rulemaking).  
 157 Id. at 397. 
 158 See id. at 396 (concluding that judicial review in the D.C. Circuit did not significantly 
impede agencies in the pursuit of their policy goals). 
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Elena Kagan, courts take a “hard look at whether the agencies 
themselves have taken a hard look.”159 
Historically, arbitrary and capricious review involved 
something more akin to minimal rationality review.  However, in 
the landmark State Farm case, the Supreme Court shifted toward 
requiring an agency to explain its reasoning.160  Although the 
Court has recently and emphatically signaled that the arbitrary 
and capricious standard is to be “narrow,”161 the standard does 
require an agency to show that it actually had a reasonable 
rationale at the time for its action.162  Ideal clarity in the agency’s 
explanation is not required, however, if the connection between the 
agency’s reasoning and action can reasonably be made.163  The 
agency must offer in support of its action statutory, technocratic, 
scientifically-driven, or other non-political reasons.164  To survive 
judicial scrutiny, the agency’s process must “address all significant 
issues, take into account all relevant data, consider all feasible 
alternatives, develop an extensive evidentiary record, and provide 
a detailed explanation of its conclusions.”165  A court determines 
the adequacy of the agency’s process by examining the entire 
record for the action under review.166   
Courts tend to frame arbitrary and capricious analysis in expert 
and data-driven terms.167  In response to this regime, scholars 
                                                                                                                   
 159 See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2380 (2001). 
 160 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–43 
(1983); Matthew J. McGrath, Note, Convergence of the Substantial Evidence and Arbitrary 
and Capricious Standards of Review During Informal Rulemaking, 54 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
541, 550–53 (1986). 
 161 FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. (Fox I), 556 U.S. 502, 513 (2009) (“Under what we 
have called this ‘narrow’ standard of review, we insist that an agency ‘examine the relevant 
data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action.’ ” (quoting State Farm, 463 U.S. 
at 43)). 
 162 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 42–43. 
 163 Fox I, 556 U.S. at 513–14 (citing Bowman Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 
Inc., 419 U.S. 281, 286 (1974)). 
 164 See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious 
Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 5–6 (2009). 
 165 See Kagan, supra note 159, at 2270. 
 166 State Farm, 463 U.S. at 44. 
 167 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 534 (2007) (holding EPA’s decision to deny a 
rulemaking petition on greenhouse gasses arbitrary and capricious for failure to provide 
adequate data and scientific grounds for the denial); UAW v. Chao, 361 F.3d 249, 254–56 
(3d Cir. 2004) (upholding OSHA’s denial of a rulemaking petition after determining that 
OSHA had adequately surveyed available scientific data); see also Wedgewood Vill. 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2015 11:46 AM 
1094  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1067 
 
have split on whether to include political rationales as legitimate 
reasons to justify agency action under the standard.168  More 
recent judicial opinions have indicated a willingness to accept 
political reasoning by agencies.169 
Accordingly, an agency operating under the APA template is 
faced with an incentive to undergo relatively burdensome notice 
and comment rulemaking procedures, or be faced with the 
prospect of seeing the rule invalidated on procedural grounds.   
According to the ossification hypothesis, the prospect 
of facing hard look review by the courts has caused 
administrative agencies to become reluctant to use the 
informal rulemaking process, with its attendant 
benefits of clear prior notice, widespread public 
participation, and comprehensive resolution of issues 
affecting large numbers of people or economic 
activities.170  
                                                                                                                   
Pharmacy v. DEA, 509 F.3d 541, 549 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (drawing heavily from State Farm); 
Morall v. DEA, 412 F.3d 165, 177 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (same).  
 168 See Kagan, supra note 159, at 2380 (proposing that hard look review be relaxed when 
the President takes an active role in shaping policy); Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing 
“Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1130 (2010) 
(arguing that in order to promote transparency, agencies should be required to disclose 
influences on their decisionmaking and that some political influences may be legitimate 
considerations); Watts, supra note 164, at 32–33 (arguing for an expanded scope of 
acceptable reasoning under the arbitrary and capricious standard, including political 
considerations).   But see Enrique Armijo, Politics, Rulemaking, and Judicial Review: A 
Response to Professor Watts, 62 ADMIN. L. REV. 573, 574–79 (2010) (arguing that the APA 
should continue to shield agency rulemaking from the political branches and critiquing 
Watts’s analysis of Fox I); Jodi L. Short, The Political Turn in American Administrative 
Law: Power, Rationality, and Reasons, 61 DUKE L.J. 1811, 1811–12 (2012) (critiquing 
political reason giving models because they would undermine the social and organizational 
structures under which agencies operate). 
 169 See Fox I, 556 U.S. at 515, 517–18 (upholding under arbitrary and capricious review an 
FCC indecency sanction, which represented a change in policy, noting the changed political 
landscape in Congress and that State Farm does not require a higher standard of review for 
policy change); Chao, 361 F.3d at 256 (Pollak, J., concurring) (acknowledging the role the 
change in presidential administrations played in OSHA’s denial of a rulemaking petition). 
 170 Jordan, supra note 156, at 394 (noting but rejecting this consensus); see also M. Elizabeth 
Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 1383, 1390–91 (2004) (“These 
requirements may sound minimal, and the Congress that set them forth likely envisioned 
them to be, but today, promulgating an important legislative rule is a labor-intensive 
enterprise.  Although there are many reasons for this, it is unquestionably due in part to 
judicially imposed requirements that an agency must follow if it expects to survive a challenge 
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Moreover, because the effective date generally may not precede the 
issuance of the final rule under the APA, invalidation on 
procedural grounds may leave no rule to cover actions taken by 
regulated parties in the interim, even if the latter have full notice 
of the agency’s intended course of action.171  The agency might also 
avoid rulemaking in favor of adjudication, assuming an adequate 
basis exists in preexisting authority.172 
2.  Tax Rulemaking as Modified by the Code.  Tax rulemaking 
under the Code differs substantially and importantly from the 
APA template.173  Section 7805(b) of the Code provides explicit 
authority for tax rules to take effect retroactively: 
Retroactivity of regulations.— 
(1) In general.—Except as otherwise provided in this 
subsection, no temporary, proposed, or final regulation 
relating to the internal revenue laws shall apply to any 
taxable period ending before the earliest of the 
following dates: 
(A) The date on which such regulation is filed with the 
Federal Register. 
(B) In the case of any final regulation, the date on 
which any proposed or temporary regulation to which 
such final regulation relates was filed with the Federal 
Register. 
(C) The date on which any notice substantially 
describing the expected contents of any temporary, 
proposed, or final regulation is issued to the public. 
(2) Exception for promptly issued regulations.—
Paragraph (1) shall not apply to regulations filed or 
issued within 18 months of the date of the enactment 
                                                                                                                   
to its action in court—requirements that affect an agency even if its rule does not wind up in 
court.”). 
 171 See Ronald M. Levin, “Vacation” at Sea: Judicial Remedies and Equitable Discretion in 
Administrative Law, 53 DUKE L.J. 291, 299 (2003) (noting that courts have sometimes 
exercised discretion to avoid disruptions when a rule falls to a procedural challenge). 
 172 See Magill, supra note 170, at 1396 (discussing an agency’s selection of administrative 
adjudication over legislative rulemaking). 
 173 See generally Puckett, supra note 3, at 368–70 (considering hybrid procedures under 
section 7805(b), distinct from the APA). 
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of the statutory provision to which the regulation 
relates. 
(3) Prevention of abuse.—The Secretary may 
provide that any regulation may take effect or apply 
retroactively to prevent abuse.174  
Because of this unusual retroactive rulemaking option, the IRS 
and Treasury arguably do not face the same incentives as a typical 
agency when considering which administrative modality to utilize 
to make tax policy.175  As discussed below, the differential choice of 
modality analysis stems from the ability of the IRS and Treasury 
to make rules effective, under ordinary circumstances, as early as 
the issuance of “any notice substantially describing the expected 
contents.”176  
Under these rules, invalidation of a tax regulation on 
procedural grounds could have very different implications for the 
IRS and Treasury.  It would be risky to challenge a tax regulation 
on procedural grounds, assuming that the regulation may be 
reissued with retroactive effect, backdated under section 
7805(b)(1)(C) to the date when the public had notice of the 
expected contents.  That is not to say there could never be any use 
to a taxpayer in mounting such a procedural challenge.  Issuing a 
final regulation takes time and resources; thus, a taxpayer could 
obtain a favorable verdict premised on the invalidity of a 
regulation, though a regulation reissued before appeal might 
reverse the outcome for that taxpayer—and would apply to others. 
The problems of a rule-free period pending reissuance could be 
somewhat mitigated if courts remanded to the IRS.177  If courts 
remanded as is ordinary in judicial review of agency action,178 the 
IRS would have an opportunity to decide the matter without the 
procedurally invalid rule, and might reissue a valid retroactive 
rule before litigating in court again.  This also would promote 
equal treatment of similarly situated taxpayers.  
                                                                                                                   
 174 I.R.C. § 7805(b) (2012). 
 175 For potential criticism of this analysis, see infra notes 189–98 and accompanying text.  
 176 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1)(C).  
 177 See infra Parts III.B.3, IV.A (discussing the failure of courts to remand in tax 
controversies and the associated consequences). 
 178 See infra note 249 and accompanying text. 
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Although current Code section 7805(b) already appears to 
permit the IRS and Treasury much more rulemaking flexibility 
than a typical agency enjoys under the APA,179 it is also possible 
that old section 7805(b)—an even more retroactivity-friendly 
predecessor—still applies.  Prior to amendment, section 7805(b) 
allowed the Treasury to “prescribe the extent, if any, to which any 
ruling or regulation, relating to the internal revenue laws, shall be 
applied without retroactive effect.”180  The uncodified text of the 
act provides that the new section 7805(b) applies to “regulations 
which relate to statutory provisions enacted on or after [July 30, 
1996,] the date of the enactment of this Act.”181  A key question is 
whether the “enacted on or after” phrase modifies “regulations” or 
“statutory provisions.”  If the former pairing is correct,182 then all 
new regulations would be covered by the new (and less flexible) 
section 7805(b).  If the latter is correct, then only regulations 
relating to more recent Code sections would be covered by the new 
section 7805(b).    
The IRS has announced its position that only regulations 
relating to post-1996 Code sections are covered by the new section 
7805(b).183  This is not a mere self-serving position; arguably, it is 
the reading that is most natural and does not render superfluous 
the “statutory provisions” language.184  Although the IRS and 
Treasury have not issued a regulation to implement that litigating 
position, such a regulation would possibly be eligible for Chevron 
deference.185  
                                                                                                                   
 179 See infra notes 284–87 and accompanying text. 
 180 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(1) (1994) (amended 1996). 
 181 Taxpayer Bill of Rights 2, Pub. L. No. 104-168, § 1101(b), 110 Stat. 1468, 1469 (1996). 
 182 I.e., if the meaning is “regulations enacted on or after July 30, 1996.” 
 183 Definition of Omission in Gross Income, 75 Fed. Reg. 78,897-01 (Dec. 17, 2010) (to be 
codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 301). 
 184 Otherwise, would the effective date language be carving out some regulations that do 
not relate to statutory provisions?  This seems like an odd reading indeed, but one that is 
necessary to conclude that “enacted” relates to “regulations” rather than “statutory 
provisions.”  Otherwise, the words “statutory provisions” would appear to carry no weight.  
 185 In City of Arlington v. FCC, the Supreme Court clarified that there is no special 
category of jurisdictional questions that are to be carved out of Chevron deference.  133 S. 
Ct. 1863, 1874–75 (2013).  Justice Scalia’s pithy conclusion is instructive: 
Those who assert that applying Chevron to “jurisdictional” interpretations 
“leaves the fox in charge of the henhouse” overlook the reality that a 
separate category of “jurisdictional” interpretations does not exist.  The fox-
in-the-henhouse syndrome is to be avoided not by establishing an arbitrary 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2015 11:46 AM 
1098  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1067 
 
Beyond the argument that old section 7805(b) still applies fairly 
broadly, the IRS and Treasury have tools at their disposal under 
new section 7805(b).  The IRS and Treasury may enact retroactive 
rules to “prevent abuse.”186  Rules qualifying under this provision 
could potentially apply to prior tax years, even if the public had no 
notice from the IRS that it intended to issue a rule.187  Although 
this is an area where one would expect deference post-Mayo, there 
is sparse existing case law, and it is mixed in terms of deference to 
the IRS.188 
This Article’s observations regarding the impact of Code section 
7805(b) will likely face criticism. Addressing section 7805(e), 
Kristin Hickman has argued that a temporary (interim-final) 
regulation cannot meet the standards of the APA unless it meets 
an exception to notice and comment, such as the interpretative 
rules or good cause exceptions.189 Although Professor Hickman 
does not, others could attempt to build on her reasoning to argue 
that section 7805(b)190 fails to relax any APA requirements.191   
APA § 559 provides that a “[s]ubsequent statute may not be 
held to supersede or modify [the APA] . . . except to the extent that 
                                                                                                                   
and undefinable category of agency decisionmaking that is accorded no 
deference, but by taking seriously, and applying rigorously, in all cases, 
statutory limits on agencies’ authority.  Where Congress has established a 
clear line, the agency cannot go beyond it; and where Congress has 
established an ambiguous line, the agency can go no further than the 
ambiguity will fairly allow.  But in rigorously applying the latter rule, a 
court need not pause to puzzle over whether the interpretive question 
presented is “jurisdictional.”  If “the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute,” that is the end of the matter. 
Id. (quoting Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842 
(1984)). 
 186 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(3) (2012). 
 187 Retroactivity is limited by the Constitution’s guarantee of substantive due process, but 
the standard is very difficult to satisfy absent a reversal of a firmly established rule; 
clarifying ambiguities retroactively should be permissible.  See Puckett, supra note 3, at 
374–83. 
 188 See generally McCormack, supra note 3 (surveying cases in the lower federal courts on 
what constitutes an abuse of discretion in preventing abuse). 
 189 See Brief for Professor Kristin E. Hickman as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents, 
at 14-19, United States v. Home Concrete & Supply LLC, 132 S. Ct. 1836 (2012) (No. 11-
139) (arguing that I.R.C. § 7805(e) fails to satisfy the high threshold for recognition as an 
exception from APA rulemaking). 
 190 I.R.C. § 7805(b)(l)(C). 
 191 Cf. Hickman, supra note 189 (arguing that the APA requirements are fully applicable 
to Treasury regulations enacted under section 7805(e)). 
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it does so expressly.”192  Stuart Benjamin and Arti Rai have 
suggested that specification of a different standard would suffice:  
Such specification both demonstrates that the organic 
statute is, indeed, intended to supersede the APA and 
also tells courts what sort of review to apply.  A lack of 
specificity deprives courts of statutory language to 
guide them in reviewing agency action and thus 
underscores that the APA still applies.193   
The difficulty with review of tax guidance is that the Code does not 
obviously or explicitly supplant the APA rulemaking procedures in 
their entirety.  
Professor Hickman, building on a broad reading of § 559, argues 
that the good cause exception rarely applies194 and that tax 
regulations are not interpretative because the disregard of a 
regulation risks tax penalties.195  Hickman acknowledges that 
there is nothing necessarily inconsistent in a Treasury regulation 
undergoing notice-and-comment before being backdated to the 
date of the notice of proposed rulemaking.196 However, others 
might attempt to build on Hickman’s work to argue that the APA 
practically nullifies section 7805(b), because the APA does not 
generally allow backdating of legislative rules.  Such an argument 
seems particularly strained with respect to garden variety notice-
                                                                                                                   
 192 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2012).  
 193 Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent 
System Can Learn from Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 282–83 (2007). 
 194 Hickman, supra note 3, at 493–94.  As Professor Hickman explains, “courts generally 
require agencies asserting the good cause exception to do so expressly and contemporaneously, 
and with specificity and particularity.”  Id.  Moreover, “courts tend to be skeptical of generic 
assertions of a need for immediate guidance . . . [and] generally limit the scope of the exception 
to truly unusual circumstances, such as when public safety is threatened or advance notice of 
a rule might undermine its application.”  Id. at 494. 
 195 Id. at 471 (“Following the Supreme Court’s delegation premise, I contend that, at a 
minimum, statutory penalties for noncompliance with agency rules should serve as a 
definitive signal that Congress intended those rules to carry the force of law for both the 
APA and Chevron deference.”).  
 196 See Hickman, supra note 32, at 1193 (“[I]f Treasury is able to make a Treasury 
regulation retroactively applicable to the date of the prelitigation NPRM or other notice, 
then procedural challenges are of little use to the taxpayers who raise them.”). 
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and-comment Treasury regulations.197 Even with respect to 
temporary Treasury regulations, one could argue that Congress 
has acquiesced in Treasury’s practice of undertaking post-
promulgation comment.198  
To be clear, this Article does not posit that section 7805(b) 
supplants all APA rulemaking requirements; rather, courts should 
carefully harmonize the two schemes in a manner that affords 
significant effect to such a detailed and facially broad Code 
provision.  Giving significant effect to section 7805(b) seems more 
likely Congress’s intent than for section 7805(b) to apply 
principally in cases of inconsequential matters or emergencies 
contemplated by the APA good cause exception (presumably 
inapplicable to tax).  
Yet another impediment exists to taxpayers challenging tax 
regulations on procedural grounds.  Pre-enforcement challenges to 
regulations under the APA are the norm.199  However, the Anti-
Injunction Act and the Declaratory Judgment Act bar most pre-
enforcement challenges to tax regulations.200  In Enochs v. 
Williams Packing & Navigation Co.,201 the Supreme Court 
characterized the purpose of section 7421 as “to permit the United 
States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due without judicial 
intervention, and to require that the legal right to the disputed 
sums be determined in a suit for refund.”202  Moreover, the bar 
extends beyond collection situations to cases where the remedy 
would indirectly affect the taxpayer’s tax liability.203  An exception 
may be available only if there would be irreparable harm to the 
taxpayer and “under no circumstances could the Government 
                                                                                                                   
 197 See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973) (noting the 
importance of following Congress’s language in the organic enactment without rendering 
words meaningless). 
 198 See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
 199 See Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149–56 (1967), overruled on other grounds, 
Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 105 (1977) (allowing for pre-enforcement review under the 
APA). 
 200 I.R.C. § 7421 (2012); Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a) (2012). 
 201 370 U.S. 1 (1962). 
 202 Id. at 7. 
 203 See Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725, 725 (1974) (holding that a court may not 
enjoin the Service from revoking a tax exemption that, if granted, would lower a 
university’s tax liability). 
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ultimately prevail.”204  Meeting these requirements seems 
virtually impossible, and indeed, the Supreme Court has never 
found them satisfied.205  
In sum, before moving on to the subtopic of adjudication, it is 
appropriate to underscore the substantial implications of the 
Code’s flexibility with respect to rulemaking.  The grant of 
retroactive rulemaking power vitiates one of the main reasons for 
challenging a rule.   
Suppose a party wishes to invalidate a typical non-tax rule.  If 
the court finds the rule procedurally deficient, the agency cannot 
apply the rule until after it has undergone notice and comment 
again.  And it cannot apply the rule retrospectively, even though 
regulated parties had notice of the agency’s intentions.206  
Taxpayers, however, would not seem to have much to gain by 
invalidating a regulation on procedural grounds, if the IRS may 
simply reissue it and apply it retroactively (either under section 
7805(b)(1) or to prevent abuse under section 7805(b)(3)).207 
                                                                                                                   
 204 Williams Packing, 370 U.S. at 7. 
 205 See Hickman, supra note 32, at 1170–71 (suggesting that the Supreme Court’s failure 
to apply the Williams Packing exception is “perhaps unsurprising,” given the exacting 
requirements).  In Cohen v. United States, the D.C. Circuit allowed an APA challenge to a 
telephone excise tax refund procedure promulgated in a notice issued without notice and 
comment.  650 F.3d 717, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011).  The opinion in Cohen seems practically 
confined to the issuance of refund procedures.  In distinguishing Williams Packing, the 
court acknowledged:  
[T]his suit is sui generis.  Allowing Appellants to proceed without first filing 
a refund claim will not open the courthouse door to those wishing to avoid 
administrative exhaustion procedures in other cases.  In the tax context, 
the only APA suits subject to review would be those cases pertaining to 
final agency action unrelated to tax assessment and collection.  More 
broadly, litigants could not avoid exhaustion when challenging agency 
decisionmaking, because McCarthy and its progeny apply only when 
litigants challenge the exhaustion scheme itself.  And once litigated, 
precedent would preclude later litigants challenging exhaustion procedures 
from relying on McCarthy in a court that had previously rejected the same 
argument. 
Id. at 733. 
 206 See supra note 171 and accompanying text.  Cf. FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 2307, 2317–20 (2012) (holding that a retroactive reversal of the FCC’s guidelines 
concerning fleeting expletives violated due process on account of vagueness and failure to 
give fair notice to regulated parties). 
 207 See Hickman, supra note 32, at 1193–94 (“If a reviewing court is likely to conclude that 
Treasury’s pursuit of notice and comment in finalizing regulations cures the procedural 
flaws of the preceding temporary ones, then taxpayers gain nothing from raising procedural 
challenges against Treasury’s earlier procedural failures.  Likewise, if Treasury is able to 
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3.  Judicial Review of Legal Conclusions in Rulemaking.  
Assuming that an agency’s rules survive procedural review, a 
court may need to further consider whether to respect the agency’s 
conclusions in such guidance.  Courts generally defer, to some 
extent, to the positions of an agency vested with authority to 
implement the relevant statute.208  Deference regimes to some 
extent respect separation of powers and comparative institutional 
advantage at policymaking.209  If Chevron applies, there is little 
more for a reviewing court to do, because Chevron essentially is a 
subset of arbitrary and capricious review.210  However, if the less 
deferential Skidmore framework applies, the position of an agency 
is entitled to deference to the extent the position is persuasive, 
taking into account such factors as “the thoroughness evident in 
its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with 
earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give 
it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”211  Which of 
these frameworks applies can sometimes be an exercise in 
guesswork.212  
Although Mayo clarified that notice and comment Treasury 
regulations qualify for Chevron deference,213 many unsettled 
questions remain in the area of judicial review of tax guidance.  
For example, do temporary Treasury regulations qualify for 
Chevron deference?  Are they void ab initio?  Similar questions 
arise with respect to subregulatory guidance, such as IRS Revenue 
Rulings and IRS Notices.  As discussed above, Professor Hickman 
has suggested that Treasury regulations or even subregulatory 
                                                                                                                   
make a Treasury regulation retroactively applicable to the date of the prelitigation NPRM 
or other notice, then procedural challenges are of little use to the taxpayers who raise 
them.”). 
 208 See Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L.J. 833, 
833–34 (2001) (describing Chevron’s expansion of judicial deference to agencies). 
 209 See NEIL KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNATIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, 
ECONOMICS, AND PUBLIC POLICY 124–25, 139–49 (1994) (comparing the advantages of 
agencies versus courts); cf. Merrill & Hickman, supra note 208, at 865–66 (discussing the 
idea that deference is a second-best solution to the nondelegation doctrine). 
 210 See Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 483 n.7 (2011) (stating “our analysis would be 
the same” under Chevron step two and APA arbitrary and capricious review). 
 211 See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944). 
 212 See Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1349, 1352 (2013) (likening to a 
lottery administrative agencies’ menu of procedural choices and the linkage to muddled 
deference doctrines). 
 213 See Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 57 (2011). 
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rules promulgated without notice and comment are, because of 
applicable penalty provisions, vulnerable to procedural challenge, 
though taxpayers may have little interest in overturning 
regulations that address “minor housekeeping matters.”214  
Another potential approach would be for courts to defer under 
Skidmore prior to tax guidance undergoing notice and comment.  
The underlying assumption would be that rules can be 
interpretative despite the existence of penalty provisions.215  If, on 
the other hand, a rule is legislative and no exemption from APA 
notice and comment applies, rather than invalidating the rule, 
courts could remand the relevant matter to the IRS and Treasury 
for further consideration.  
Even given the IRS and Treasury’s retroactive rulemaking 
power, it would be disruptive if courts invalidated most tax 
guidance issued without notice and comment.216  The IRS and 
Treasury might not choose to take the time to reissue every 
particular rule that the courts invalidate; they might simply turn 
to enforcement by litigation rather than giving general guidance.  
In addition, given the impetus from a court to redo a rulemaking, 
the IRS and Treasury may modify the rules, upsetting 
expectations at the margins.  
B.  ADJUDICATION 
Rulemaking is not a practical way to address every matter 
conceivably before an agency.  Sometimes agencies do not discover 
policy problems before they are presented with a concrete factual 
situation.  Moreover, given the intensiveness of judicial review of 
rulemaking, agencies may conclude that it is better to forego 
rulemaking and make policy through adjudication.217  As discussed 
below, the choice between rulemaking and adjudication generally 
                                                                                                                   
 214 See Hickman, supra note 3, at 471–72; see also supra notes 189–98 and accompanying 
text. 
 215 See Puckett, supra note 3, at 367–74 (arguing that Skidmore deference is appropriate if 
there has not been an opportunity for meaningful public participation). 
 216 See Hickman, supra note 3, at 530–31 (“Categorically invalidating and remanding 
Treasury regulations with temporary origins would upset taxpayers’ settled expectations 
and could seem more arbitrary and capricious than leaving the regulations in place 
notwithstanding their procedural flaws.”). 
 217 See supra note 172 and accompanying text (discussing how agencies may choose 
adjudication over rulemaking outside the tax context). 
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is flexible.218  Somewhat different—though still deferential—
standards govern judicial review of a typical administrative 
agency’s formal adjudication.219  Tax adjudication, however, is 
special because it is largely informal at the IRS level;220 
accordingly, the IRS is unable to maintain control over 
adjudication in the manner that a more typical agency may use to 
accomplish its regulatory goals. 
1.  Adjudication under the APA.  In the landmark Chenery II 
decision, after acknowledging that prospective rulemaking would 
generally be optimal, the Supreme Court afforded agencies wide 
discretion to make policy through retrospective adjudication: 
[A]ny rigid requirement to that effect would make the 
administrative process inflexible and incapable of 
dealing with many of the specialized problems which 
arise.  Not every principle essential to the effective 
administration of a statute can or should be cast 
immediately into the mold of a general rule.  Some 
principles must await their own development, while 
others must be adjusted to meet particular, 
unforeseeable situations.  In performing its important 
functions in these respects, therefore, an 
administrative agency must be equipped to act either 
by general rule or by individual order.  To insist upon 
one form of action to the exclusion of the other is to 
exalt form over necessity.221 
The word “adjudication” may conjure an image of a trial-like 
proceeding.  However, for APA purposes, adjudication can also be a 
catch-all category for the residual of agency action that is not 
rulemaking.222  This does include trial-like proceedings,223 but also 
includes informal determinations such as whether a letter bears 
                                                                                                                   
 218 See infra notes 221–32 and accompanying text. 
 219 See infra notes 233–40 and accompanying text. 
 220 See infra notes 243–49 and accompanying text. 
 221 SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1947). 
 222 5 U.S.C. §§ 554–555 (2012). 
 223 See Michael Ray, Standing in the Way of Judicial Review: Assertion of the Deliberative 
Process Privilege in APA Cases, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349, 382 (2009) (discussing the formal 
proceedings required in §§ 556–557). 
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the correct postage.  If the organic statute requires a hearing on 
the record, trial-type procedures are triggered.224  However, an 
agency may choose to provide a more formal process even if it is 
not required to abide by the on-the-record hearing requirements of 
the APA.225 
Agency adjudication has long been a staple method for 
administrative agencies affecting important rights of regulated 
parties.226  But it has, at the same time, been controversial in some 
quarters.  The declaration of a principle and simultaneous 
application of it to the party in an adjudication provides little 
notice to regulated parties.227  Moreover, a classical conception of 
separation of powers would be offended by the vesting of quasi-
judicial functions in the same body that makes rules and 
prosecutes violations of those rules.228  
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court in the landmark Chenery II 
case upheld the discretion of agencies to choose to make policy 
through adjudication rather than rulemaking.229  In NLRB v. Bell 
                                                                                                                   
 224 5 U.S.C. § 554(a).  The Supreme Court has not yet definitively ruled on whether a 
hearing requirement in the context of adjudication triggers formal adjudication, but has 
held that a mere hearing requirement does not require formal procedures in the context of a 
rulemaking.  See United States v. Fla. E. Coast Ry. Co., 410 U.S. 224, 237–38 (1973) (noting 
that a “hearing” requirement, without more, does not trigger formal procedures in the 
context of a rulemaking).  The lower federal courts (except for the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Ninth Circuit) have generally tracked Florida East Coast Railway, even in the context 
of adjudication, looking for a requirement that the hearing be “on the record” to trigger 
formal adjudication procedures.  See Chem. Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. EPA, 873 F.2d 1477, 1482 
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (“We will henceforth make no presumption that a statutory ‘hearing’ 
requirement does or does not compel the agency to undertake a formal ‘hearing on the 
record,’ thereby leaving it to the agency, as an initial matter, to resolve the ambiguity.”).  
But see Marathon Oil Co. v. EPA, 564 F.2d 1253, 1264 (9th Cir. 1977) (“In summary, the 
crucial question is not whether particular talismanic language was used but whether the 
proceedings under review fall within that category of quasi-judicial proceedings deserving of 
special procedural protections.”). 
 225 Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 
(1978) (“[A]gencies are free to grant additional procedural rights . . . .”). 
 226 In fact, Chenery II itself dealt with an SEC adjudication that imposed novel restraints 
on a corporation.  Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 201–09. 
 227 See John F. Manning, Nonlegislative Rules, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 893, 930 (2004) 
(quoting Judge Williams describing agency adjudication as “ad hocery . . . that affords less 
notice . . . to affected parties” than informal rulemaking (quoting Am. Mining Cong. v. Mine 
Safety & Health Admin., 995 F.2d 1106, 1111–12 (D.C. Cir. 1993))). 
 228 See supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. 
 229 Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203 (stating that “the choice made between proceeding by 
general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is one that lies primarily in the informed 
discretion of the administrative agency”). 
GEORGIA LAW REVIEW (DO NOT DELETE) 11/17/2015 11:46 AM 
1106  GEORGIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:1067 
 
Aerospace Co., the Court reaffirmed this principle of agency 
discretion, permitting the NLRB to reverse policy through an 
adjudication.230  However, dicta suggests that an agency may not 
impose an obligation retroactively where a party will suffer 
“substantial” harm for actions taken in “good-faith reliance” on 
prior guidance.231  The scholarly consensus is that such 
disallowance should be rare and unusual.232 
2.  Judicial Review of Findings of Fact and Legal Conclusions.  
Courts review agency findings of fact in adjudicatory proceedings 
under the “substantial evidence” test.233 For legal conclusions, the 
same principles of judicial review applicable to legal conclusions in 
rulemaking apply.234  As discussed above, legal conclusions may 
receive either Chevron deference (the agency’s conclusion stands if 
it is not arbitrary and capricious) or Skidmore deference (the 
agency’s conclusion receives deference to the extent of its power to 
persuade based on all the facts and circumstances).235  In United 
States v. Mead Corp., the Supreme Court held that Chevron 
                                                                                                                   
 230 416 U.S. 267, 292–94 (1974). 
 231 Id. at 295; see also Heckler v. Cmty. Health Servs. of Crawford Cnty., Inc., 467 U.S. 51, 
60 & n.12 (1984) (refusing to adopt a “flat rule that estoppel may not in any circumstances 
run against the Government” and noting that “this principle also underlies the doctrine that 
an administrative agency may not apply a new rule retroactively when to do so would 
unduly intrude upon reasonable reliance interests” (citing Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 295; 
Atchison, T. & S.F.R. Co. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807–08 (1973) (plurality 
opinion); Chenery II, 332 U.S. at 203)). 
 232 Pierce summarizes the state of the law as follows:  
The Court has not even suggested that a court can constrain an agency’s 
choice between rulemaking and adjudication in any opinion since Bell 
Aerospace.  Nor has it suggested any content that might be given its vague 
reference to “abuse of discretion” as a potential basis for reversing an 
agency’s decision to rely on adjudication as a means of announcing a “rule.” 
Thus, [the court decisions on the subject] must be taken as a flat rejection 
of any judicial attempt to constrain agencies from developing “rules” 
through the adjudicatory process. 
1 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 6.9 (5th ed. 2010); cf. 
Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 
523–24 (1978) (holding that the APA provides ceiling and floor procedural 
requirements for rulemaking unless Congress otherwise provides). 
 233 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(E) (2012). 
 234 Id. § 706(2)(A); see also supra Part III.A.3 (describing judicial review of legal 
conclusions in rulemaking). 
 235 See supra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
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generally applies to legal conclusions arrived at through formal—
but generally not informal—adjudication.236  
The arbitrary and capricious standard237 is a useful comparator 
for thinking about the meaning of “substantial evidence.”  Some 
administrative law scholars have concluded that there is no 
difference, in practice, between the two standards.238  As Magill 
explains,  
[S]ome members of Congress viewed the scope-of-
review provisions as a response to insufficiently 
rigorous judicial review of agency factfinding . . . that 
courts had upheld agency factual determinations if 
there was any evidence (even a “mere scintilla”) in the 
record supporting the agency’s conclusions, without 
regard to the evidence in the record that contradicted 
or cast doubt on the supporting evidence.239 
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, the Supreme Court defined 
the standard as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind 
might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”240 
3.  De Novo Review of Tax Deficiency Determinations.  The 
adjudication of tax controversies is, like tax rulemaking, very 
specialized.  The system relies, at the first level, on individual 
taxpayers voluntarily assessing their tax liability and filing a 
return if their income exceeds the filing threshold.241  At the first 
stage, each taxpayer has the responsibility of organizing their 
records and taking the first shot at determining their income.  The 
IRS reviews the return and compares it against matching data it 
has received from other sources, may request additional 
                                                                                                                   
 236 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 230–31 (2001) (observing that 
“Congress contemplates administrative action with the effect of law when it provides for a 
relatively formal administrative procedure tending to foster the fairness and deliberation 
that should underlie a pronouncement of such force,” and that “the overwhelming number of 
our cases applying Chevron deference have reviewed the fruits of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking or formal adjudication”). 
 237 See supra Part III.A.1. 
 238 See Magill, supra note 170, at 1428–30 (describing the malleability of both standards 
in practice). 
 239 Id. at 1428–29. 
 240 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938). 
 241 See I.R.C. §§ 6011–6012 (2012). 
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information, or may conduct an audit of a randomly selected 
taxpayer.242  If the IRS disagrees with the taxpayer’s conclusion as 
to how much tax is due, it must give the taxpayer notice before 
technically assessing and collecting the deficiency.243  The 
statutory notice provides the taxpayer an opportunity to protest 
the deficiency in Tax Court without first paying the tax due.244  
However, if the taxpayer pays the full amount of tax due, the 
taxpayer has the option of suing in district court or the Court of 
Federal Claims for a refund.245 
In tax deficiency litigation, facts are adjudicated de novo246 in 
the Tax Court as well as in refund courts.247  The court will also 
rule on legal issues, potentially applying a deference doctrine, and 
enter a judgment without remanding to the IRS.248  This is also 
distinct from general administrative agency practice, where 
remand is the normal remedy if the agency has not adequately 
explained its decision when it initially considers the matter at 
hand.249 
                                                                                                                   
 242 See id. §§ 6201–6203 (assessment of tax liability); cf. Kenneth H. Ryesky, Taxation 
Unchecked and Unbalance: The Supreme Court’s Denial of Certiorari in Sorrentino, 41 
GONZ. L. REV. 505, 524 (2006) (discussing the privacy implications of the IRS’s information 
gathering enforcement methods). 
 243 I.R.C. § 6212 (2012). 
 244 Id. § 6213(a). 
 245 Id. § 7422; Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 163 (1960) (discussing the two types of 
tribunals available for taxpayers, dependent on pre-payment or post-payment of the 
assessment due). 
 246 Stephanie Hoffer and Chris Walker examine adjudication by the Tax Court and argue 
for application of the ordinary remand rule; however, their argument primarily applies to 
limited groups of cases: innocent spouse determinations, collection due process matters, or 
other instances where the trial de novo provisions do not apply.  See Stephanie R. Hoffer & 
Christopher J. Walker, The Death of Tax Court Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. 221, 267–
68 (2014). 
 247 See Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax Collection 
Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429, 438–39 (2008) (discussing the level of discretion 
employed by the Tax Court).  
 248 See I.R.C. §§ 6214–6215 (giving the Tax Court jurisdiction to determine deficiencies; 
Id. § 7482(c)(1) (giving the United States Courts of Appeals the power to affirm, modify, or 
reverse the decision of the Tax Court, “with or without remanding the case for rehearing”). 
 249 See 3 PIERCE, supra note 232, § 18.1.  In the landmark Chenery I decision, the Supreme 
Court reaffirmed the principle that agency action normally is set aside until the agency can 
articulate a justifiable explanation for its action:  
In finding that the Commission’s order cannot be sustained, we are not 
imposing any trammels on its powers.  We are not enforcing formal 
requirements.  We are not suggesting that the Commission must justify its 
exercise of administrative discretion in any particular manner or with 
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IV.  INTERROGATING STRUCTURAL TAX EXCEPTIONALISM 
Having surveyed the structural differences between tax 
administration and the agency template under the APA,250 it 
appears that Mayo’s end to tax exceptionalism is really more of a 
change in nomenclature than a paradigm shift.  Beyond the 
legalistic conclusion that tax exceptionalism is not truly dead, the 
question remains whether structural tax exceptionalism is more 
than just historical accident.  Accordingly, this Part interrogates 
structural tax exceptionalism across three important policy 
criteria: effective use of agency expertise, procedural fairness, and 
incentives to choose rulemaking versus adjudication.  These 
observations are necessarily preliminary and lay a foundation for 
future work in this area. 
A.  EXPERTISE 
One of the primary goals of delegating the implementation of 
statutory schemes to agencies is to have an impartial, expert 
decisionmaker develop more specific, coherent policies.251  Thus, 
one of the first questions to ask about structural tax 
exceptionalism is whether it bears a high cost in terms of foregone 
benefits of agency expertise. 
As this Article has argued, tax rulemaking is generally far more 
flexible than the APA template, granting the IRS and Treasury 
wide latitude to implement policy by rule.252  Although structural 
tax exceptionalism surely facilitates the rulemaking modality, one 
could question whether tax adjudication facilitates the use of 
agency expertise as well.253  Two key departures from the APA 
adjudication template stand in the way of agency expertise.  The 
IRS is not able to develop a record, find the facts, and confine 
                                                                                                                   
artistic refinement.  We are not sticking in the bark of words.  We merely 
hold that an administrative order cannot be upheld unless the grounds 
upon which the agency acted in exercising its powers were those upon 
which its action can be sustained. 
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). 
 250 See supra Part III. 
 251 See Datla & Revesz, supra note 23, at 777.  
 252 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 253 See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 246, at 273–76. 
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judicial review to a record that has already been developed.254  
Moreover, a reviewing court generally will not remand a case to 
the IRS for further consideration in a tax controversy.255 
It is debatable whether the fact finding function in isolation 
makes a significant difference in terms of expertise.  Indeed, it is 
conceivable that courts are superior to the IRS at looking at 
extremely varied factual settings and evaluating credibility.  
Theoretically, even mixed questions can be separated into 
questions of fact and law, though the distinction can be quite 
elusive.256  Provided that the IRS receives appropriate deference 
on the legal elements in a mixed question, the fact that a court 
finds facts is not so troubling.  That last proviso, however, soon 
turns out to be a weak spot in tax administration. 
The lack of formal adjudicatory power of the IRS goes beyond 
just factfinding.  Under the Supreme Court’s framework in Mead, 
the IRS will not receive Chevron deference on its legal conclusions, 
absent a prior tax rule to apply.257  Accordingly, the application of 
tax expertise is hampered compared to the APA baseline.  In 
contrast, the SEC may, if it prefers, formulate and at the same 
time apply broad standards to a regulated party in a formal 
adjudication.  It would, in turn, receive Chevron deference on its 
legal conclusions.258  Chevron had not been decided at the time of 
the Supreme Court’s landmark Chenery II decision; however, the 
SEC’s announcement of a new standard in a formal adjudication259 
now would receive Chevron deference under Mead.260  But the 
informal process of the IRS sending a notice of deficiency is 
undoubtedly too informal to generate deference under the 
                                                                                                                   
 254 See supra Part III.B.3 (noting courts’ de novo review of facts in tax controversies). 
 255 See Hoffer & Walker, supra note 246, at 273–76 
 256 See Leandra Lederman, (Un)appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835, 
1867–72 & n.168 (2014). 
 257 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229–33 (2001) (refusing to apply 
Chevron deference to agency determinations that are “far removed . . . from notice-and-
comment rulemaking”).  If the IRS is interpreting a preexisting agency rule or regulation 
(an agency authority—not just the Code), a Chevron-like doctrine variously known as Auer 
or Seminole Rock suggests that the IRS’s interpretation would control unless “plainly 
erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”  Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997) 
(quoting Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 359 (1989) (quoting 
Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325 U.S. 410, 414 (1945))).  
 258 See supra note 236 and accompanying text. 
 259 See supra note 221 and accompanying text. 
 260 See supra note 236. 
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apparent Mead safe harbors,261 nor does a notice of deficiency seem 
like the kind of agency process that Congress would have expected 
to receive deference (the more general thesis of Mead).262 
Moreover, even outside of situations where deference doctrines 
truly make a difference, it is conceivable that the failure of courts 
to remand to the IRS in tax litigation promotes dysfunctional 
agency behavior and hampers reasoned decisionmaking.  With 
respect to the latter, it may be overly optimistic to expect coherent 
decisionmaking from the IRS given that the IRS does not really 
know what the facts are before it litigates in court.  Because 
parties can introduce new evidence at trial, and all findings of fact 
are subject to de novo review by the court,263 applying the law to 
the facts at the IRS level is something of a guessing game.  This is 
very much unlike the APA template where the court’s review is 
strictly limited to the record adduced at the agency level,264 and 
the agency’s fact findings should be respected if supported by 
substantial evidence.265  Making the IRS just another litigant in 
controversies rather than reserving for it a more quasi-judicial role 
probably tends to promote exaggerated, litigation-oriented 
argumentation that is unhelpful to taxpayers as guidance of 
general applicability.  If matters were remanded to the IRS when a 
reviewing court is unsatisfied with the agency’s explanation, it 
would give the IRS a better chance to formulate durable and 
general principles of tax law and policy. 
Remands, of course, have potential drawbacks.  They are 
potentially costly in terms of agency and court resources.  
Moreover, in the tax context, interest is accruing, and the taxpayer 
                                                                                                                   
 261 See Mead, 533 U.S. at 229–31 (describing the situations where Chevron deference is 
appropriate). 
 262 See id. at 229–34 (describing the situation in Mead that did not warrant Chevron 
deference). 
 263 See Johnson, supra note 4, at 1822–23 (2014) (noting that review of facts is de novo, 
and arguing that the Tax Court is a “reviewing” court even though it considers evidence not 
considered by the agency). 
 264 See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (holding 
that the record for review of adjudication was the record before the agency at the time of its 
decision and not a new record created on judicial review of the agency’s action); cf. United 
States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods. Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 248–50, 253 (2d Cir. 1977) (invalidating 
FDA rules for processing fish because the notice of proposed rulemaking failed to include 
significant data upon which the FDA relied and noting that de novo evidence was properly 
excluded by the district court). 
 265 See supra note 233 and accompanying text. 
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may be prejudiced by delay.  Finally, not all tax controversies 
feature issues that would truly benefit substantially from a 
remand.266  On balance, however, it seems premature to conclude 
that remands could never be optimal particularly if the forum is 
the Tax Court, where the taxpayer is less likely to suffer from 
acute liquidity issues. 
B.  PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS AND TAXPAYER MORALE 
It is often said that our tax system depends critically on 
voluntary compliance.267 Accordingly, it is important that 
taxpayers respect the system; otherwise, they may cheat more 
and, indirectly, cause everyone else to pay more.  Nancy Welsh 
comments that 
Although issues of procedural justice often do not 
attract as much public attention as concerns about 
distributive justice, research has shown that when 
people experience dispute resolution and decision-
making procedures, they “pay a great deal of attention 
to the way things are done [i.e., how decisions are 
                                                                                                                   
 266 See Hickman, supra note 32, at 1196.  Hickman has questioned the potential benefits 
of a remand.  “Theoretically, the court could also remand the taxpayer’s individual case to 
the IRS for further adjudication in light of its invalidation of the underlying regulation, but 
to what end?”  Id. 
 267 See, e.g., Bryan T. Camp, Tax Administration as Inquisitorial Process and the Partial 
Paradigm Shift in the IRS Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998, 56 FLA. L. REV. 1, 5–6 
(2004).  Professor Camp cogently observes that: 
Like many clichés, however, “voluntary self-assessment” is true in a more 
significant sense than it is false.  The tax determination process ultimately 
rests on taxpayers disclosing their financial affairs and paying what they 
owe—through withholding or otherwise—without overt government 
compulsion.  It is “voluntary” in the same sense that stopping one’s car at a 
red light—at midnight with no traffic and no one looking—is voluntary.  It 
is each citizen’s self-enforcement of the legal duty that keeps both the tax 
and transportation systems running smoothly.  With over 130 million 
individual returns and over 80 million other returns (not including 
information returns) filed in calendar year 2001, the system depends on the 
veracity, if not the kindness, of taxpayers. 
Id. (footnote omitted). 
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made] and the nuances of their treatment by 
others.”268 
Moreover, perceptions of procedural justice often have a strong 
effect on perceptions of distributional fairness (and much stronger 
than the reverse effect).269 
Design of tax adjudication should heed these teachings.  Studies 
have shown a strong preference for a traditional adversarial trial 
rather than an inquisitorial process in which the same party 
investigates and decides.270  Moreover, given the pervasive 
mistrust of the IRS, one should especially hesitate to consider 
combining formal adjudication under the umbrella of the IRS 
rather than vesting such power primarily in the courts.  
Differentiating tax adjudication, which involves not only repeat 
players with large claims but also individuals and small 
businesses, has some basis in empirical work showing that 
institutional litigants care little about procedural fairness and 
focus only on the outcome.271  
The Code’s vesting of formal adjudication primarily with the 
courts, rather than with the IRS (as the APA template would 
otherwise provide), appears to have important benefits for 
taxpayer perceptions of fairness.272  All other things being equal, 
perceptions that the system is fair should increase willingness to 
                                                                                                                   
 268 Nancy A. Welsh, Making Deals in Court-Connected Mediation: What’s Justice Got to Do 
With It?, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 787, 817–18 (2001) (quoting E. ALLAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE 
SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE 242 (1988)); see also Elizabeth Chamblee 
Burch, Procedural Justice in Nonclass Aggregation, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 5–6 (2009) 
(noting the significance of procedural justice for institutional legitimacy and voluntary 
compliance); Tom R. Tyler, The Psychological Consequences of Judicial Procedures: 
Implications for Civil Commitment Hearings, 46 SMU L. REV. 433, 435–39 (1992) 
(discussing the psychological impact of judicial procedures); William G. Young & Jordan M. 
Singer, Bench Presence: Toward a More Complete Model of Federal District Court 
Productivity, 118 PENN. ST. L. REV. 55, 56–59 (2014) (advocating a definition of judicial 
productivity that incorporates measures of accuracy and procedural fairness). 
 269 Welsh, supra note 268, at 818–19. 
 270 See Burch, supra note 268, at 29 (citing JOHN THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, 
PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 104 (1975)). 
 271 See Welsh, supra note 268, at 818 nn.148–49 (citing studies that suggest a distinction 
between individual and institutional litigants). 
 272 See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 19–20, 22, 59–62, 147–50, 162–63, 178, 
234–35 (1990) (emphasizing the importance of the law’s consistency with prevailing norms 
of justice within a particular community and noting specifically that the low non-compliance 
with income tax is explainable from a normative, but not instrumentalist, perspective). 
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pay or decrease willingness to cheat.  One countervailing feature is 
the Code’s grant of retroactive rulemaking authority to the IRS 
and Treasury.  To the extent that this seems quasi-adjudicatory, it 
could also seem unfair that the IRS and Treasury are able to issue 
such guidance.  However, retroactive application of rules can be a 
powerful tool to (1) prevent abuse or (2) apply the same rules to 
similarly situated taxpayers with tax years still open under the 
statute of limitations on assessment.  On balance, these latter 
features should promote perceptions of fairness, assuming the rule 
is a clarification rather than unexpected change.  
The principal cost of vesting formal adjudication with the courts 
is the tendency of courts to reach disparate outcomes on similar 
facts.273  This bears at least two kinds of costs.  First, complexity 
makes tax planning more difficult and expensive.  Second, 
applying different rules to similarly situated taxpayers can lead to 
perceptions of unfairness. 
On the other hand, a defense of decentralized decisionmaking 
can be made.  Ronald Krotoszynski, in assessing whether the 
judicial power of the United States should be more centralized, 
makes a persuasive defense of our current (decentralized) system 
of judicial circuits: 
By making the decisional process on important, but 
difficult, questions of constitutional law a collective 
endeavor, placed in entirely separate hands, operating 
largely independently of each other, the risk of 
insufficiently considered—reasoned—decision making 
is substantially reduced (as are some of the risks of 
collective, collegial decision making, such as so-called 
“group think”).  When disparate and independent 
courts ask and answer the same question and render 
                                                                                                                   
 273 See, e.g., Bryna Lee Rosen, Note, The Home Office Deduction Game: Will Soliman v. 
Commissioner Return the Taxpayer to Square One?, 12 VA. TAX REV. 141, 148 (1992) 
(describing a situation where Tax Court adjudication became so disparate that Congress 
intervened). 
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the same answer, the legitimacy of that answer is 
greatly enhanced.274 
One of the key benefits of decentralized judicial decisionmaking is 
capture avoidance.275  “By decentralizing the federal courts and 
creating separate juridical entities that operate more or less 
entirely independently of each other, Congress has greatly reduced 
the risk of agency capture with respect to the federal courts.”276 
Independent from the anti-capture protection of the courts, 
Krotoszynski argues that decentralized decisionmaking helps 
avoid cognitive bias or dysfunction, such as “groupthink.”277  
Groupthink is most likely a problem for a cohesive, insulated 
group.278  As a threshold matter, the IRS and Treasury may simply 
not be the kind of institutions that are likely to be prone to 
groupthink, given the number of employees and their different 
backgrounds.  However, it is possible that certain subgroups in the 
agency could be at risk.  Symptoms of groupthink vary, but 
notably include taking extreme positions and overconfidence, 
especially in the morality of the group as opposed to outsiders.279  
Another dysfunctional group dynamic is social loafing, or 
diminished individual effort toward group products, in part 
because obtaining credit for one’s contribution may be difficult or 
impossible.280 
Although more immediate simplicity and consistency can be 
attractive, the legitimacy benefits of hundreds of different judges, 
from different political backgrounds, considering tax matters is 
also attractive.  On the other hand, because the IRS and Treasury 
have the power to promulgate very specific rules and even 
retroactive rules, they have some discretion to effectively opt out of 
                                                                                                                   
 274 Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., The Unitary Executive and the Plural Judiciary: On the 
Potential Virtues of Decentralized Judicial Power, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1021, 1027 (2014) 
(footnote omitted). 
 275 Id. at 1050. 
 276 Id. 
 277 Id. at 1066 (“Although the available evidence is mixed, in general creating a plethora of 
diverse and independent decision makers should improve the quality of the decisional 
process and, by implication, the quality of the decisions themselves.”). 
 278 Id. 
 279 Id. at 1067. 
 280 Id. at 1071. 
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adjudication on certain issues, if they are willing to undertake the 
procedures required for the rulemaking process. 
C.  CHOICE OF POLICYMAKING MODALITY 
As is perhaps evident from the Supreme Court’s decades-old 
dicta in Chenery II, most commentators would prefer, all other 
things being equal, that agencies make policy through prospective 
rules to the extent reasonably feasible.281  However, as Elizabeth 
Magill aptly has stated,  
Each form should be thought of as a package with 
specific features—the procedure the agency must 
follow; whether and how the agency’s action binds 
private parties; whether and when the agency’s action 
can be challenged in court; and the standard that a 
court will apply when that suit is brought.282 
Accordingly, an agency cannot necessarily be expected to utilize 
rulemaking rather than adjudication, even if it has notice of a 
potential issue about which the public would benefit from 
guidance.283 
                                                                                                                   
 281 See supra note 221 and accompanying text; Magill, supra note 170, at 1396 (“A 
common lament is that agency reliance on administrative adjudication in the enforcement 
context is unfair because it permits the agency to pick a sympathetic target and to present 
its view in a friendly forum (depending on the agency), and may mean that a newly minted 
legal obligation will be imposed retroactively on a single target.”). 
 282 Magill, supra note 170, at 1396. 
 283 Mark Grunewald has explained why the NLRB failed to engage in rulemaking for 
approximately fifty years, despite “[d]ecades of critical commentary, frequent prodding from 
reviewing courts, and legislative proposals for mandatory rulemaking.”  Mark H. 
Grunewald, The NLRB’s First Rulemaking: An Exercise in Pragmatism, 41 DUKE L.J. 274, 
274–75 (1991) (footnotes omitted).  When the NLRB turned to considering whether 
rulemaking would be desirable, the meeting was contentious, considering such factors as  
(1) whether rulemaking would stimulate the submission of useful empirical 
data or would simply attract the same generalized legal/policy arguments 
heard in adjudications; (2) whether the data that might be submitted would 
provide as reliable a basis for policymaking as the evidence that is admitted 
and tested through cross-examination in adjudications; (3) whether loss of 
the assumed sensitivity of case-by-case consideration would be offset by the 
assumed speed and efficiency of a generalized approach; (4) whether the 
process of proposing and possibly modifying proposed rules calls into 
question or enhances the concept of Board expertise; (5) whether the 
Board’s regulated constituencies would find rulemaking credible and 
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As discussed in Part III, a typical agency may bind through a 
formal adjudication and receive a strong degree of deference on 
both findings of fact and legal conclusions.  With two of the factors 
(bindingness and deference) being roughly equal, for a typical 
agency, the remaining key consideration is whether the procedures 
for formal adjudication are less demanding than those of informal 
rulemaking.  And indeed, there is a sense that “hard look” review 
for rulemaking has rendered rulemaking very burdensome.284  
Accordingly, agencies often may have an incentive to avoid 
rulemaking and instead announce new policies through 
adjudication. 
Because of the unusual features of tax rulemaking and 
adjudication, the incentives are reversed.  Tax rulemaking is 
generally more flexible and less likely to be challenged on 
procedural grounds in any event because the Anti-Injunction Act 
and Declaratory Judgment Act almost always postpone challenges 
to regulations until after enforcement.285  Meanwhile, adjudication 
is not as tempting an alternative to rulemaking, because tax 
adjudication at the agency level does not follow APA formal 
adjudication procedures.286  Facing de novo review at the 
reviewing court, the IRS could attempt to narrow the issues by 
rulemaking. 
In this instance, structural tax exceptionalism appears to carry 
a benefit in that it promotes rulemaking over adjudication.  That 
incentive is generally beneficial because rulemaking provides 
guidance and allows effective planning.  However, for those who 
value the public participation element of rulemaking, the current 
system arguably comes up short because comments often may 
follow promulgation of a rule.287  On balance, however, post-
                                                                                                                   
participate; and (6) whether the Board could continue to adjust policy 
through adjudication having undertaken rulemaking. 
Id. at 293. 
 284 See Manning, supra note 227, at 914 n.117 (noting that the doctrine has “greatly 
increased the cost of notice-and-comment rulemaking by intensifying the agencies’ 
obligation to release material data as part of the relevant notice, to create a rulemaking 
‘record’ for judicial review, and to respond to important issues raised during the comment 
period”). 
 285 See supra Part III.A.2. 
 286 See supra Part III.B.2. 
 287 Cf. Hickman, supra note 3, at 519–20 (“Much like the legislative process, the APA’s 
notice and comment requirements provide the agency with ‘the facts and information 
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promulgation consideration of comments may be a reasonable 
price to pay for increased prospective guidance. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
This Article has interrogated the prevailing wisdom that tax 
exceptionalism is dead, a common refrain that the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Mayo288 has sparked.  Undertaking a 
comparative historical and structural analysis of tax 
administration side by side with typical agency administration, 
one important contribution of this Article is to clarify that 
applying Mayo’s mandate to apply a “uniform”289 approach carries 
a very thin, residual effect.  That is because the structure of tax 
administration—in terms of rulemaking and adjudication—is so 
exceptional.   
Beyond the legalistic conclusion that neither reviewing courts 
nor the IRS and Treasury can truly escape tax exceptionalism, this 
Article has identified important historical and current policy 
justifications for the persistence of structural tax exceptionalism.  
Moreover, it shows how the unusual features of tax rulemaking 
and adjudication articulate with one another in a reasonably 
coherent, though extremely complicated, manner.  Although there 
may be benefits to reshaping the structure of tax administration to 
be less exceptional (i.e., more like most other federal 
administrative agencies), there are also likely to be complicated 
advantages and disadvantages to such a shift.   
The benefits of assimilation to the APA template could include 
more consistent and fairer outcomes and enhanced use of the 
expertise of the IRS and Treasury.  However, the tax system may, 
for pragmatic cultural reasons, require more judicial control over 
tax controversies and more flexibility with respect to the issuance 
of guidance than a typical federal administrative agency.  
Assimilation to the APA template could potentially mean less 
guidance through rulemaking, more case by case adjudication, 
                                                                                                                   
relevant to a particular administrative problem, as well as suggestions for alternative 
solutions,’ and ‘reintroduce public participation and fairness to affected parties after 
governmental authority has been delegated to unrepresentative agencies.’ ” (footnotes 
omitted) (quoting Am. Hosp. Ass’n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1044 (D.C. Cir. 1987))). 
 288 Mayo Found. for Educ. & Research v. United States, 562 U.S. 44 (2011). 
 289  Id. at 713 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)). 
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lower taxpayer morale, and lower voluntary tax compliance.  
Accordingly, this Article urges caution before ending structural tax 
exceptionalism in a quest for more uniform administrative law.  
Uniformity is an important value, to be sure, but it is not the only 
relevant consideration at stake. 
 
